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“LIBERTY REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY”: THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, LUCIA V. SEC, AND
THE NEXT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY
MICHAEL A. SABINO, ESQ.*
ABSTRACT
“Liberty requires accountability” is the essential precept
which animates the Appointments Clause of Article II. This constitutional safeguard assures that those who exercise the sovereign
power of the United States remain accountable both to the Chief
Executive who appointed them and to the People who elected that
President. The proviso was most recently tested in Lucia v. SEC,
and, most assuredly, shall be in controversy again. After first
expositing the high Court’s extensive Appointments Clause jurisprudence presaging Lucia, this Article thoroughly explores this
newest Article II landmark, before concluding with commentary
upon future Appointments Clause challenges expected to soon arrive before the Supreme Court.

Associate, Crowell & Moring LLP. The opinions expressed by the author
herein are solely his own and should not be attributed to his firm or clients. The
author dedicates this Article to his beloved spouse, Katlyn, and his children,
William and Charlotte.
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INTRODUCTION
For over eight decades now, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or “the Commission”) has been the primary
watchdog over Wall Street.1 Since its inception in 1934,2 the SEC
has been tasked with regulating the securities industry in its varied
and sundry forms. The Commission’s oversight ranges broadly from
superintending the issuance of securities,3 to policing the marketplace for securities fraud.4 We are therefore accustomed to
witnessing the agency exert its regulatory powers over corporations, broker-dealers, and other industry participants.
What is rare—indeed, almost novel—is the SEC occupying
the eye of a constitutional storm. One does not normally associate
the Commission with a controversy implicating the precise meaning of Article II of the Constitution, and its ramifications for the
wielding of presidential authority.
Yet that is exactly the scenario which brought the SEC before the United States Supreme Court in Raymond J. Lucia, et al.
v. SEC.5 In a challenge to the lawful authority of the in-house jurists the Commission employs to adjudicate alleged violations of
the federal securities laws, the very power of the Chief Executive
to appoint, and remove, Executive Branch officials was put to
the test.6
We write this Article, not merely to exposit the immediacy
of the Court’s newest landmark decision with respect to securities law enforcement, but with even greater awareness as to how
this decision, conceived in a securities industry dispute, holds
grave and long-lasting ramifications for constitutional law. For
Lucia is far more than a high Court precedent regarding the federal securities laws; it is destined to enter the pantheon of constitutional landmark decisions which determine the very meaning
of the Constitution, particularly with respect to assuring that the
Executive Branch remains accountable to the People. Keeping
that overriding significance in mind, we proceed to the task at hand.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
Id.
3 See generally id. § 77.
4 Id. § 78j-1(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
5 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2044 (2018).
6 Id. at 2061.
1
2
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To that end, this Article shall first set forth the essentials
of the Commission’s enforcement power, and the adjudicative
structure empowering its administrative law judges (“ALJs”). It
is imperative that we follow by setting forth the constitutional
landmarks that regulate the manner in which officials of this
type attain office, so we can better comprehend the roots of the
Article II controversy addressed by Lucia. We shall then proceed
to a brief recapitulation of the controversy in its nascent stage
before the federal district courts.
Thereafter, we shall explore how different circuit courts of
appeals took varying approaches in the main endeavor to avoid
the constitutional controversy. This will naturally bring us to
the point of unavoidable conflict between two tribunals, one of them
the birthplace of the Lucia case, which then finally percolated to
the highest level of the American judiciary.
The final element of this essential prelude shall include
notation of the government’s sharp course reversal with respect
to defending the decision below. All that accomplished, we shall
then embark upon a detailed examination of Lucia in all its
noteworthy aspects.
To be sure, our final analysis shall not be confined to the
ramifications Lucia holds for the SEC’s enforcement of the securities laws. It is our intention to delve deeply into the broader,
constitutional implications of the instant case, and its more lasting
meaning for Article II, the Executive Branch, and all administrative agencies.
I.GAINING PERSPECTIVE: SECURITIES LAW, THE SEC, AND ITS ALJS
To have the fullest appreciation possible of Lucia, one must
first understand the securities law which provides the backdrop
for this latest pronouncement. Certainly, in Lucia, the Supreme
Court ruled upon a constitutional challenge rooted in the Appointments Clause of Article II.7 Yet, since the office-holders
thereby challenged were part of the imposing construct that is federal securities regulation, the appropriate point of view is taken
from the New Deal–era laws which have assured the nation of
open and honest capital markets since the 1930s.8
7
8

See id. at 2063.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
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The edifice that is modern federal securities law is firmly
based on two cornerstones. The first is the Securities Act of
1933.9 The other noble cornerstone is the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.10
The 1934 Act established the Securities and Exchange
Commission as the paramount federal regulator of the Nation’s
securities markets.11 The SEC is authorized by statute to commence
administrative enforcement proceedings against those believed
to have violated the various securities acts.12
Heading the agency are five Commissioners, each appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.13 Unquestionably, the five appointees that comprise the
SEC’s ruling council are not only officers of the United States,
but qualify as principal officers of the United States residing
within the Executive Branch.14
Obviously, five mere mortals could never undertake the
herculean task of overseeing the securities exchanges and its
denizens without the assistance of a sizable bureaucracy. The
Depression-era Congress wisely gave the Commission “the authority to delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions” to, among others, “an administrative law judge.”15 The
powers which may be delegated to such a jurist include, and are
not limited to, “hearing, determining, ordering ... or otherwise
acting” with respect to any SEC function.16
In-house agency adjudicators, once called “hearing examiners,” were given the title “Administrative Law Judges” in 1978,
and the number of such positions was increased.17 Thus, the
Id. § 77a. Commonly referred to as “the ’33 Act,” its focus upon regulating
the initial issuance of securities places it well outside the scope of the instant Article, notwithstanding that enactment’s own fascinating and noteworthy aspects.
10 Id. § 78a. The promulgation goes by more than one nom de guerre. It is
frequently shorthanded as the “Exchange Act,” “the 1934 Act,” or, lastly, “the
’34 Act.” Accordingly, we shall use these referents interchangeably herein.
11 Id. § 78d(a).
12 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1; The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3; The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-9(b); The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e).
13 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(a).
14 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15 § 78d-1(a).
16 Id.
17 See Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183, 183–84 (1978).
9
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controversy which this Article concerns itself with grew from
that tiny seed.
Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it might be said that
this innocuous name change helped precipitate the Appointments Clause challenge under discussion here. Forty years ago,
the lawmakers casually observed that administrative law judges
“hold a position with tenure very similar to that provided for
Federal judges under the Constitution.”18 The imprecision of that
comparison was fraught with peril and portended the constitutional crisis this Article now addresses.
To be sure, these newly minted ALJs were not granted
autonomy. Undoubtedly to preserve accountability to the Chief
Executive and the People, it was declared that “the Commission
shall retain a discretionary right to review the action of any ...
administrative law judge.”19
This oversight prerogative can be initiated by the Commission sua sponte “or upon petition of a party.”20 Only a single
Commissioner need vote in favor of review in order to bring any
ALJ action before the full body.21
Significantly, should the SEC decline to exercise its power
of oversight or if review is not requested in a timely manner, then
the action decreed by an administrative law judge “shall ... be
deemed the action of the Commission.”22 Note well the legislative
choice of the imperative “shall,” and not the permissive “may,” in
this particular proviso.
Of course, who guards the guardians? After all, the SEC
is an administrative body.23 Its awesome powers to regulate the
stock markets must be kept in check, lest we descend into a totalitarian regime.
To protect against such calamities, any person aggrieved
“by a final order of the Commission” may seek judicial review of
S. REP. NO. 95-697, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 496, 497;
see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–15 (1978) (administrative law judges
enjoy absolute immunity from damages lawsuits because they are “functionally
comparable” to judges).
19 § 78d-1(b) (emphasis added).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. § 78d-1(c) (emphasis added).
23 See id. § 78d.
18
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the relevant judgment either “in the United States Court of Appeals
for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of
business” or, alternatively, “the District of Columbia Circuit.”24
Not only does this assure Article III oversight, thereby preserving
accountability, and, hence, liberty, the various options for the
situs of the reviewing court often plays a role in the evolution of
these proceedings, including the matter now under discussion.
And while the appellate tribunal is empowered to affirm,
modify or overturn “in whole or in part” any final order of the
Commission,25 the regulators’ factual findings are conclusive, provided they are supported by substantial evidence.26
The essentials of this regulatory infrastructure, that being
the Commission, its lawful delegation of authority to administrative law judges, and so forth, remained fundamentally the
same well into the Twenty First Century.27 It took the cataclysm
of the Great Recession to statutorily modify the SEC’s enforcement
powers in such a way as to provoke a constitutional challenge to
its in-house adjudicators.28
This enabling legislation, made law during the heat of the
financial meltdown in the late 2000s, is correctly known by the
turgid moniker of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.29 Better known by the far less cumbersome
appellation of Dodd-Frank, this is a body of remedial statutes
epic in proportion, and physically the size of an old-fashioned
telephone directory.30 Thankfully, the Appointments Clause issue
extant here permits us to take a laser-like focus upon the sole
proviso germane to the instant controversy.
The revamped law expanded the role of the Commission’s
administrative law judges in the following manner. Prior to the
new enactment, if the SEC sought a monetary penalty against a
§ 78y(a)(1).
§ 78y(a)(3).
26 § 78y(a)(4).
27 See generally id. § 78a.
28 Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and
remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
29 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1(a), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), reprinted in 2010
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1; see also Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
30 See generally Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), reprinted
in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1.
24
25
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nonregulated individual or entity, the agency was required to
file suit in an appropriate federal district court.31
Dodd-Frank changed all that by giving the regulators the
choice of bringing such an action in the district court or by commencing an administrative enforcement proceeding before its inhouse adjudicators.32 To be sure, the choice of the forum to proceed
in lies solely within the agency’s discretion.33
At least one appellate court declared that Dodd-Frank
“dramatically expanded” the Commission’s power to institute
enforcement proceedings before its own ALJs, reputedly “with a rate
of success notably higher than it has achieved in federal district
courts.”34 Thus, at the commencement of the second decade of
the Twenty First Century, we find the SEC possessed a newfound
power.35 No longer was it required to bring supposed miscreants
before a federal trial court for adjudication; now, the Commission
could try alleged wrongdoers before its own, in-house tribunal.36
To summarize, the duties and powers of the SEC’s present-day adjudicators, particularly in light of the Dodd-Frank
enforcement regime, predict the controversy under review here.
By virtue of their traditional prerogatives, as enhanced by the
Dodd-Frank reforms, ALJs now play an even more critical role
in upholding the federal securities acts.37
The Commission’s in-house jurists hear cases and create
records of those proceedings.38 These adjudicators find facts, draw
conclusions of law, and decide the validity of charges brought by the
SEC against private persons.39 Notwithstanding subsequent
review by the Commission—if any—ALJs most certainly do not
merely advise, recommend, or investigate.40 In every sense of
Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N.
33 Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
2187 (2017).
34 Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
35 Id. at 278.
36 Id. at 279.
37 See id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (2006).
31
32
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the phrase, the agency’s internal jurists exercise, by any yardstick, significant sovereign authority.41
This concludes our primer upon the fundamental notions
of federal securities regulation that set the stage for Lucia. As
indicated, many of these statutory norms have existed since the
Securities and Exchange Commission was created via the 1934
Act.42 Nevertheless, it was the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
legislation, conceived in the crisis atmosphere of the Great Recession, which sparked the constitutional conflagration over the
authority of the Commission’s ALJs.43
Yet Lucia was a constitutional crisis, not merely a dispute
under the laws regulating the securities markets.44 For that reason,
it is imperative that we next turn to the fundamental principles
of constitutional law which formed the basis for the high Court’s
newest landmark.
II.THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE: TEXTUAL FUNDAMENTALS AND
SUPREME COURT LANDMARKS
From the very inception of the Republic, one of the paramount motivations of the Founders was a justifiable concern for
power concentrated in the hands of the one or the few, and worse
yet, such authority lacking accountability to the political will of
the citizenry.45 It was this “fear that prompted the Framers to
build checks and balances into our constitutional structure.”46
Specifically, to preserve our ordered system of liberty from
the excesses of executive power, the Framers acted upon a fundamental and inarguable precept. “Liberty requires accountability.”47 In recognition of that basic truth, the Framers incorporated
several “accountability checkpoints” into the Constitution,48
each one securing separation of powers and checks and balances.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012).
43 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126–27; Tilton, 824 F.3d at 276, 279–80.
44 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018).
45 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1244 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1234 (Alito, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring).
41
42

182 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:173
Several of these guardians of our precious liberty are
found within Article II.49 Concurrent with establishing the duties
and responsibilities of the Executive Branch, and empowering the
office of the Chief Executive, the Article equally restrains presidential ambitions, by assuring the chief magistrate stays responsive to the popular will.50 Both courts and commentators have
lauded Article II as one of the Constitution’s most noble provisions,
guaranteeing accountability to the People.51
Prominent among Article II’s critical subcomponents is
the Appointments Clause, a “structural safeguard” that tethers
federal officers to the “sovereign power of the United States, and
thus to the people.”52 Above all else, the Appointments Clause
insists that those who wield executive authority remain “accountable to political force and the will of the people.”53
The requirements of the Appointments Clause are “among
the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme”
and are “designed to preserve political accountability relative to
important Government assignments.”54 In regulating the manner
of taking office, the proviso assures that appointees are “accountable
to the President, who himself is accountable to the people.”55
See U.S. CONST. art. II.
See id. § 2.
51 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential
Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 705 (2003) (quotations
and brackets omitted)).
52 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (Briscoe, J.,
concurring).
53 Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991). The
Founders indicated that dependence upon the People is a primary means of
controlling the federal government from excess. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
at 356 (James Madison) (Wright ed., 1961); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 136 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004). In his majestic paean to American freedom, de Tocqueville eloquently posits the following:
“In order to maintain the republican form of government, it was essential that
the [President] ... be subject to the national will.” To that end, de Tocqueville
observes that the Senate oversees the Chief Executive “in the distribution of
appointments, so that he can neither corrupt nor be corrupted.” Id. And, finally,
this erudite witness to America’s early years adds the following gem, quite
apropos to the instant controversy: The President “ought to be left as free as
possible to choose his own agents and to dismiss them at will.” Id. at 146.
54 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 663 (1997).
55 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito,
J., concurring).
49
50
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Accountability is maintained by the Appointments Clause
in the following manner: officers of the United States are appointed by the President, who answers to the People.56 When the
electorate takes exception to the action of an executive officer,
they protest to the Chief Executive who they elected, and she
must then inquire of the appointee.57 This is how the chain of
responsibility operates, and the unitary and uniform execution
of the law secured.58
With regard to the relevant text of the Appointments Clause,
its most visible segment is well known to most Americans. The
President is empowered, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to nominate and appoint ambassadors, “ministers” (cabinet
level department heads in more modern terms), “Judges of the
[S]upreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.”59
It is unassailable that all officers of the United States must be
appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.60
Not as high profile, but nevertheless at the eye of the constitutional tempest which is the subject of this Article, the Appointments Clause makes further provision that Congress may,
by law, “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.”61
Distilled to its essence, and highly germane to the instant
discussion, Article II posits the foregoing as an alternative to the
more cumbersome (and, dare we say, more politically contentious)
process of presidential nomination subject to senatorial oversight.62
Presuming a statutory grant, the Chief Executive, as well as department heads and the courts, enjoy the inherent authority to
emplace lesser office-holders.63
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2.
See id.
58 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II ), 881 F.3d 75, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 (1976) (holding Federal Election
Commissioners performing significant governmental duties pursuant to public
law were properly classified as “officers of the United States” but had failed to
attain office in conformity with the Appointments Clause).
61 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
62 See id.
63 See id.
56
57
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At the end of the day, the Appointments Clause provides
meaningful assurance that officers of the United States do not
elude the reach of the Chief Executive, and, thereby, the People.64
That is, the Appointments Clause, textually speaking. How it has
been interpreted and applied is our next topic.
A.Free Enterprise Fund
In the main, the epicenter of the high Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence is occupied by two fairly modern
landmarks. Given such, we shall posit these cornerstones first,
as the foundation of our analysis.
In contemporary Article II case law, it is beyond argument
that Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board65 stands preeminent in guaranteeing separation of
powers and checks and balances.
For nearly a decade, Free Enterprise Fund has been the pivot
upon which Appointments Clause controversies have turned.66 Its
precepts constitute a significant portion of “the best guidance we
have about the original and enduring meaning of Article II.”67
Appropriately enough for this writing, this first crucial
landmark is itself rooted in yet another financial crisis of recent
vintage. The holding of Free Enterprise Fund can be directly traced
to the accounting industry reforms made in the early 2000s,
subsequent to the scandalous doings of Enron, WorldCom, and
similar nefarious corporations being revealed to an outraged
investor class.68 To counteract the blatant financial reporting
trickery found in those ignominious cases, Congress promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).69 For all intents and purposes,

See id.
See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010).
66 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II), 881 F.3d 75, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I),
839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 155
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
67 PHH II, 881 F.3d at 155 n.13 (Henderson, J., dissenting); see, e.g., PHH I,
839 F.3d at 7, vacated and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
68 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.
69 See id.
64
65
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the legislation was a massive auditing reform law calling for
stricter oversight of the accounting profession.70
The legislation also created the respondent above named,
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the “PCAOB”
(colloquially pronounced “Peek-A-Boo”), to administer SOX’s new
regime of registering all public accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies, regimenting their standards of practice,
and imposing rigorous oversight to assure their compliance.71
The PCAOB was not without its challengers, however,
and these opponents set out to stop the Board in its tracks.72 The
chosen form of attack was to invoke the Appointments Clause of
Article II of the Constitution.73
As Chief Justice Roberts explains in Free Enterprise Fund,
the Appointments Clause authorizes the President to appoint two
classes of officers within the Executive Branch to assist in executing the laws of the United States.74 The first grouping of appointees is familiar, consisting of ambassadors, cabinet members,
and the like (such as Article III jurists), usually called “principal
officers,” whom the President appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate.75
The second set of Executive Branch adjuncts is comprised
of so-called “inferior officers,” whose defining attributes are that
they exercise significant authority in executing the laws of the
land, yet nonetheless remain accountable to the Oval Office—in
plain English, the President can fire them at will.76 The latter
point cannot be underestimated, for placing these persons beyond the Chief Executive’s power of recall is an irredeemable
constitutional error.77
Finally, there is an added nuance of the Appointments
Clause, specifically that department heads (essentially, cabinet
members and agency chiefs) and the federal courts enjoy a similar
See id.
See id.
72 See id. at 487.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
76 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493.
77 Id.
70
71
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power to invest their own “inferior officers” with authority to
assist the former in executing the laws of the land.78
And here is where Free Enterprise Fund found the fatal
flaw in constituting the PCAOB’s membership. Chief Justice
Roberts observed how the five Board members were selected by
the SEC, not appointed by the President.79 Once in place, a Board
member could only be removed “for good cause.”80 Another key
link in the chain of Free Enterprise Fund’s Appointments Clause
analysis was that the Commissioners of the SEC itself, the ones
who appoint the PCAOB members, likewise cannot be terminated,
except “for good cause.”81 Chief Justice Roberts characterized
this as, not just one, but two levels of “tenure” shielding PCAOB
members from dismissal by the Chief Executive.82
This attribute of the PCAOB led to its downfall.83 The Appointments Clause is predicated upon the notion (as articulated by
Founder James Madison while serving in the First Congress) that
only the Chief Executive holds the executive power accorded by
the Constitution, and part and parcel of her accountability to the
People in exercising that power is the unrestricted ability to dismiss appointees who are inadequate to the task of executing the
Nation’s laws.84
In other words, the Appointments Clause does not merely
regulate the manner of appointments; it assures that officeholders shall be accountable to the President who commissioned
them, and ergo, the citizens who elected the Chief Executive.85
Accordingly, the Free Enterprise Fund Court found the
SOX methodology for constituting the PCAOB antithetical to the
rigors of the Appointments Clause.86 Moreover, the liberty interest protected by the Article II proviso was further confounded by
the two levels of insulation the board members enjoyed.87
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484–85.
80 Id. at 478.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 492.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 493.
86 Id. at 503.
87 Id. at 492.
78
79
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This tenure protection made the PCAOB fundamentally
untethered to the President’s will, given the clear inability of the
President to exercise her prerogative of recall.88 The resultant
lack of accountability to the President only exacerbated the constitutional infirmity.89
While the high Court left the vast bulk of SOX undisturbed,90 this assertion of the Appointments Clause’s requirements
vis-à-vis the PCAOB set in place a vital imperative for the constitutional delegation of administrative authority, cutting across
a wide swath of regulatory agencies, and not just the ones tasked
to administer the securities laws.91 Indeed, Free Enterprise Fund
continues to emerge as a touchstone in cases questioning the
apportionment of governmental power within the Executive and
other Branches.92
We will soon see that the disavowed parameters for appointments to the PCAOB at issue in Free Enterprise Fund bore
a striking similarity to the appointive process for the Commission’s ALJs.93 That justifies our care in expositing Free Enterprise Fund as a linchpin in the imbroglio that challenged the
authority of the SEC’s adjudicators, for those similarities were
exploited to no end by those opposing the agency’s jurisdiction.94
B.Freytag
Our second high Court precedent was one that somewhat
presaged the coming of Free Enterprise Fund, albeit nearly two
decades earlier.95 In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Id. at 495.
Id.
90 Id. at 509.
91 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (bankruptcy judges do not
enjoy the full judicial power of the United States because, inter alia, they are
appointees of the Article III courts); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696–97
(1988) (as one of the seminal cases in the never-ending tug of war over empowering “inferior officers” within the three competing branches, including
ongoing divisiveness over the role of judges within the Article III branch).
92 See Stern, 564 U.S. at 503; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696–97.
93 See Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 868 (1991).
94 See id.
95 One might even venture it provided the rule for decision. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238 (2013) (Scalia, J.) (“Truth
88
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the plaintiff was a taxpayer aggrieved by the IRS’s assessment
of additional tax due.96 More importantly, this plaintiff went so
far as to challenge the very constitutionality of the judicial process whereby his tax was determined.97 Freytag’s argument was
one we are already familiar with: his main contention was that
the judicial officer hearing his controversy exercised significant
authority under federal law, yet the mode the judicial officer’s
appointment, and that of his fellows, did not comport with the
requisites of the Appointments Clause.98
Taking center stage here were the officials entitled Special
Trial Judges (STJs), effectively adjuncts to the United States Tax
Court, a body itself long deemed to be an Article I “legislative
court.”99 Indeed, in its arguments for confirming the validity of
the existing system, the government emphasized the supposedly
subordinate role of the STJs, calling them merely assistants to
the actual Tax Court jurists in such matters as taking evidence,
drafting proposed findings of fact and opinions, and other purely
ministerial tasks.100 In sum, and despite the taxpayer’s protestations to the contrary, the government held fast to its claim that
the STJs were little more than glorified clerks.101
The Supreme Court ruled otherwise, and, in taking the taxpayer’s side, carefully parsed the exact duties of these judicial
officers.102 STJs, noted the high Court, take testimony, conduct
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to
enforce compliance with discovery orders, among other things.103
In addition, the very office in which they serve is a creation of
statute, and the precise tasks, salary, and means of appointment
for STJs are likewise specified by law.104
Combining the foregoing powers of the STJs with the means
by which they attain and keep office, it was no surprise that the
to tell, our decision in AT&T Mobility all but resolves this case.” (citing AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011))).
96 See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868.
97 Id. at 872.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 880–81.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 881–82.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 881.
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Court concluded that these judicial helpmates “exercise significant discretion” in their everyday duties.105 Thus, the Supreme
Court had no hesitancy in categorizing the STJs as “inferior
officers” for Article II purposes.106
But leaving nothing to chance, Freytag did not end there.
It contrasted the STJs to “special masters,” yet another variety
of judicial appointee found across the landscape of the federal court
system.107 The role of special master is, to be sure, not established by statute, nor does the law clearly delineate the duties and
obligations of the office.108 Special masters serve the Article III
bench on a temporary and ad hoc basis or, as the Justices put it so
well, are “episodic” in the frequency of their service to the Judicial
Branch.109 This effectively forecloses any characterization of special
masters as “inferior officers,” whereas, in sharp contradistinction, it underscores the conclusion that STJs are even more deserving of that title, with all of its constitutional implications.110
Having thus set forth the appreciable powers of the STJs,
and having further placed them in exquisite counterpoise to special
masters and the latter’s comparatively limited purview, the Supreme Court readily concluded that the former exercised “significant discretion” under the law, as that term is understood for
Article II purposes.111 That established, the Court declared that
the STJs were, in fact, “inferior officers,” as Article II jurisprudence classifies that title.112 Therefore, such persons “must be
properly appointed” pursuant to the strictures of the Appointments Clause.113 And since this helpmate to the Tax Court had
not attained office in a manner consonant with Article II, his
adjudication of the plaintiff’s tax liability was invalidated.114
In sum, Freytag was the trailblazer towards the primacy
of Free Enterprise Fund in resolving contemporary disputes over
Id. at 882.
Id.
107 Id. at 881.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 882.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 892.
105
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the scope and application of the Appointments Clause. Given the
role it was to eventually play in resolving the instant controversy
over SEC ALJs, we urge mindfulness of Freytag’s carefully
drawn distinctions amongst different classifications of adjudicators,
and the sharp implications for the matter at hand.
C.Germaine
Before departing entirely from the realm of modern Appointments Clause jurisprudence, we are required to briefly explore
a Reconstruction era holding that presaged some of the current
Article II controversy. Why reach back some one hundred and
forty years to a ruling that could not have possibly conceived of
today’s Administrative State? The direct answer is because the
high Court itself called upon this venerable edict to help resolve
the controversy most recently at the bar.
United States v. Germaine presents the sordid tale of a civilian surgeon accused of extorting monies from the pension
applicants he was charged with examining.115 One aspect of his
appeal was that the avaricious medico had been prosecuted under a law calling for the fine or imprisonment of any officer of
the United States found guilty of committing extortion under color
of his office.116 The obvious prerequisite to a successful prosecution thereunder was that the defendant actually qualify as a
bona fide officer of the United States.117 Seeking to avoid that
penalty, the defendant contended he enjoyed no such status.118 To
the contrary, Germaine alleged his appointment by the Commissioner of Pensions was not compliant with the procedures mandated by Article II.119
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller made short
shrift of the entire affair.120 Obviously, the defendant had not
been appointed by the President or the courts of law.121 Adhering
strictly to the plain text of Article II, the sole question remaining
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 508–09 (1878).
Id. at 509.
117 Id. at 512.
118 Id. at 509.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 508–09.
121 Id. at 510.
115
116
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was whether the Commissioner of Pensions was the head of a
department.122 As he was not, it was clear to the Justices that
neither this defendant nor anyone holding office by virtue of the
Commissioner’s order could be deemed an officer of the United
States.123 Since Germaine did not qualify as an officer of the United
States, he could not be prosecuted under a statute prohibiting
malfeasance by such appointees.124
Relevant to today’s Appointments Clause challenge to the
power of SEC ALJs, we may draw the following lessons from
Germaine. First, “[t]he Constitution ... very clearly divides all its
officers into two classes.”125 Principal officers must be nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.126 All others, denoted as inferior officers, may attain office as appointees of the
President, the courts of law, or the heads of departments, if
Congress so provides by statute.127
Notably, the Germaine Court justified this more convenient mode of appointment as the Constitution foreseeing the day
“when officers became numerous, and sudden removals necessary.”128 One can only applaud the prescience of the Germaine
Court, not to mention the Founders, for predicting the presentday Administrative State.
Be that as it may, the Justices of that bygone era were
unequivocal in one other key finding. “[T]here can be but little
doubt” that the foregoing two methodologies are the exclusive
means by which one attains the vaunted status of Officer of the
United States.129
Id.
Id. at 511.
124 Id. at 512.
125 Id. at 509 (“[t]he Constitution ... very clearly divides all its officers into
two classes.”).
126 Id. at 509–10.
127 Id. at 510.
128 Id. (explaining that the Court justified their decision of adopting a more
convenient mode of appointment as they foresaw a time “when officers became
numerous, and sudden removals necessary ...”).
129 Id. In an expansive discussion of Executive bureaus, Justice Miller classified
other government functionaries as “mere aids and subordinates of the heads
of the departments,” citing as an example “the thousands of clerks in the
Department of the Treasury” and elsewhere. Id. at 511. Obviously, it was the
purpose of the Germaine Court to expound upon these mere employees of the
government, so as to place them in contradistinction to true officers of the
122
123
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Hereinabove, we have not only illuminated the Article II
precedents instrumental in deciding Lucia, we now have a greater
appreciation for the high Court’s fidelity to the Appointments
Clause as a guarantor of accountability, and, thereby, liberty. While
all this is a necessary precursor to the review which is soon to
follow, we must remember that the latest addition to the Court’s
Article II jurisprudence traveled a complex and arduous trail of
litigation, which we are duty bound to explore.
For while the ultimate focus of this Article shall be the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia, that new landmark cannot
be rightly contemplated in isolation. Our analysis is informed by
the many conflicting lower court opinions that preceded the high
Court’s final ruling here.
Cases similar to Lucia were first the subject of vastly different approaches taken by trial judges, and then the decisions
of various appellate tribunals took vectors in a direction totally
contrary to that of the Supreme Court’s eventual ruling.130 This
newest high Court pronouncement can only be considered in light
of its jurisprudential roots. It could be said that the saga which
is Lucia is a play in four acts. Accordingly, we expound upon it
in that fashion.
III.ACT ONE: THE TRIAL COURTS
The road to a Supreme Court landmark is typically predictable and linear. It commences when a substantial number of
federal district courts issue dissimilar rulings with regard to the
same controversy. The discord is heightened when a significant
number of circuit courts, sitting in review, declare their own
views, presumably contrary to each other. Warring factions soon
take shape, until the highest court in the land steps in, and ends
the internecine controversy by promulgating its own edict.
United States. Yet if the Supreme Court of 1878 could make such notable distinctions as to the infrastructure of the then-nascent federal bureaucracy, can we
do any less than apply that wisdom to our current Article II controversy?
Even then, in post–Civil War America, the Supreme Court found “nine-tenths
of the persons rendering service to the government undoubtedly are” mere
hirelings, not officers holding their rank pursuant to the Appointments Clause.
Id. at 509.
130 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016).
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Notably, Lucia did not precisely follow that familiar patIts contours first took shape with a remarkably small
number of trial court decisions, most of which coalesced around
a common point of argument.132 In time, said argument became
the focal point of the high Court’s attention, and therefore the
gravamen of its ultimate holding.133
Yet, at the appellate court level, a near majority of circuit
panels rejected the postulations of the lower courts, and moved
in an entirely different direction.134 In truth, two—and only two—
federal tribunals embarked upon paths which placed them in the
requisite counterpoise.135 Thus, the conflict finally resolved by
the Supreme Court entailed contentiousness between a mere
fraction of the more than one dozen circuit courts of appeals.136
That, in and of itself, is unusual.
Given that Lucia did not track in a manner customary to
the evolution of a high Court landmark, we are compelled to first
sample, ever so briefly, the decisions of selective district courts
that set the nascent controversy on the path to its final adjudication by the Justices.
Lucia’s early roots were embodied in district court rulings
addressing challenges to the SEC’s newly expanded prerogative
to have enforcement cases presided over by the agency’s in-house
adjudicators.137 Respondents named in such proceedings actively
resisted having administrative law judges hear the Commission’s charges against them.138
One of the first such cases, Hill v. SEC, presented a plaintiff of a different sort.139 Hill described himself as a real estate

tern.131

See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–50 (2018).
See In the Matter of Raymond J. Lucia Co., 106 SEC 4611 (2013) (initial decision).
133 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055–56.
134 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171 n.2.
135 Compare Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2015) vacated and remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016), with Tilton v. SEC (Tilton I ),
No. 15-CV-2472, 2015 WL 4006165, at *1, *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015).
136 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171 n.2.
137 Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC (Lucia Cos. II), 832 F.3d 277, 280–81 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
138 See generally Michael A. Sabino & Anthony Michael Sabino, Challenging the Power of SEC ALJs: A Constitutional Challenge or a More Nuanced
Approach?, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 369 (2015) [hereinafter Challenging SEC ALJs]
(analyzing the then-extant cases).
139 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1301.
131
132
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developer.140 Thus, he was not a securities industry professional,
normally subject to SEC jurisdiction.141 After he made nearly
three-quarters of a million dollars transacting in the stock of a
takeover target, the Commission accused Hill of indulging in the
wrongful act of insider trading.142
The plaintiff disputed the authority of the SEC ALJ overseeing his proceeding.143 Arguing before Judge Leigh Martin May,
Mr. Hill contended that the Commission’s administrative law
judges were officers of the United States, yet had attained office
in contravention of the Appointments Clause.144 “Not so,” countered the agency; “the SEC’s ALJs are mere employees.”145
District Judge May sided with the plaintiff.146 Her touchstone was Freytag’s postulation that the exercise of “significant
authority” was the litmus test for deciding if an Executive Branch
functionary is an officer of the United States, subject to the rigors
of the Appointments Clause.147
For all these reasons, Hill was among the first of the lower
courts to hold that the Commission’s in-house adjudicators held
office in violation of the Appointments Clause.148
Notably, Hill offered a means to end the evolving controversy before it erupted into a full-blown constitutional crisis.
District Judge May suggested that the full Commission, collectively
a head of a department as contemplated by Article II, nominate
and appoint each and every SEC ALJ.149 But, lacking any such
Id.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1304–05.
144 Id. at 1316.
145 Id. at 1317. Hill elaborated upon how ALJs assume office, thusly. The
Commission’s administrative law judges are hired internally by the agency’s
Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the SEC’s Chief ALJ, its
Office of Personnel Management, and the agency’s human resources department.
Significantly, an ALJ enjoys a “career appointment,” with a salary set by statute.
Id. at 1303.
146 Id. at 1317.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1319 (explaining that the district judge declined to address the
plaintiff’s further contention that “the ALJ’s two-layer tenure protections also
violate Article II’s removal” provisos, but in dicta expressed “serious doubts
that it does” constitute a constitutional infirmity). Id. at 1319 n.12.
149 Id. at 1320.
140
141
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initiative from the agency, Hill forbade the agency’s adjudicator
from conducting further proceedings involving this plaintiff.150
Whilst Hill emanated from southerly climes, it provided a
template for resolution adopted by certain federal trial courts
within walking distance of Wall Street itself.151 The case in
point—Duka v. SEC152—in actuality comprised an interconnected
set of rulings, which willingly joined Hill’s assessment of the
burgeoning controversy as a matter of constitutional import.153
Duka presented an industry professional accused by the
SEC of wrongdoing in disseminating inaccurate and misleading
credit ratings, to the detriment of investors who relied upon
such reports when transacting in the ranked securities.154 This
respondent sought to enjoin the Commission from further pursuit.155 Duka’s claim—like the one interposed in Hill—was an
allegation that the Appointments Clause had been violated in
empowering the agency’s in-house adjudicators.156
The end result was markedly the same.157 In a sequence
of interlocked opinions, District Judge Berman eventually concluded that SEC ALJs do, in fact, exercise “significant authority,”
as that term is utilized in the lexicon of the Appointments
Clause.158 Key to the trial court’s determination was its recognition that the Commission’s administrative law judges do much
of what ordinary judges do on an everyday basis.159
Accordingly, Duka II easily resolved the Article II question by finding that the agency’s adjudicators were, indeed, officers of the United States, and therefore required a nomination
compliant with the strictures of the Appointments Clause.160
These rulings compelled the Duka II court to halt the SEC’s
Id. at 1320–21.
Duka v. SEC (Duka I ), 103 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
152 Id., abrogated by Tilton v. SEC (Tilton II), 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2187 (2017); see also Duka v. SEC (Duka II), 124 F. Supp. 3d
287 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated and remanded No.15-2732 (2d Cir.) (June 13, 2016).
153 Duka II, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 289.
154 Duka I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 387.
155 Id. at 385–86.
156 Id. at 385.
157 Id. at 395–96.
158 Duka II, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 289.
159 Id.
160 Id.
150
151
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enforcement proceeding, given the constitutional defect in how
the presiding ALJ attained office.161
Notably, this New York district jurist took up the suggestion of his colleague from the Northern District of Georgia, to wit,
that the Commission remedy the entire matter by having the
“[h]eads of [d]epartments,” that being the Commissioners themselves, appoint the SEC ALJs anew, thereby correcting the nettlesome Article II violation.162 Regrettably, as in Hill, the agency
failed to act upon the court’s prompting.163
At this juncture, it must be remembered that federal trial
judges are not bound by the decisions of their peers, even those
from within the same judicial district.164 That fundamental truth
was exemplified in the instant controversy’s early stages.165 Specifically, yet another district jurist, also hailing from the same
vicinage as Duka II, issued a holding inapposite to both the
aforementioned and Hill.166
This contrary decision was the first iteration of Tilton v.
167
SEC Replicating the now familiar pattern, a financial professional and her affiliated companies were subjected to Commission action, based upon the SEC’s allegation that they had, jointly
and severally, violated the federal securities law.168 This plaintiff
counterattacked, alleging that the agency’s administrative law
judge took office in violation of Article II; therefore, the Commission’s enforcement case should be enjoined from continuing before
the in-house adjudicator.169
Taking a different tack from her brethren, District Judge
Ronnie Abrams disagreed with both the plaintiff before her, and
with the rulings issued in Hill and Duka II.170 To be sure, this
Id. at 290.
Id. at 289.
163 Id. at 288.
164 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2011).
165 Id. at 2532–33.
166 Id. at 2531.
167 Tilton v. SEC (Tilton I ), No. 15-CV-2472, 2015 WL 4006165, at *1, *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), aff’d, Tilton v. SEC (Tilton II), 824 F.3d 276, 276
(2d Cir. 2016).
168 Id. at *1–3.
169 Id. at *2.
170 Id. at *5.
161
162
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New York jurist, presiding in a forum within a stone’s throw of Wall
Street, was not unmindful of the plea of a constitutional defect.171
Notwithstanding the assertion of an Appointments Clause
violation, the court in Tilton I looked to the fact that the plaintiff
retained a statutory right to have an appellate court review any
sanction decreed by the SEC.172 Given the undisputed availability
of a subsequent hearing before a circuit tribunal, Tilton I refused
to prevent the Commission from proceeding with the enforcement action.173 To be sure, the highlight of Tilton I is its staunch
refusal to embrace the Appointments Clause challenge proffered
by similarly situated plaintiffs in Hill and Duka II.
We pause here for a moment of contemplation. The controversy, which was to percolate through the federal courts, and
conclude with the new landmark of Lucia, commenced with a
relatively small cross-section of trial courts at odds with each
other on the ostensible constitutional crisis.
Some halted Commission enforcement proceedings, out of
recognition of the alleged Appointments Clause violation.174
Others set to the side the purported constitutional infirmity.175
At that time, we commented that the internecine struggle
would not go away soon, nor would it depart neatly.176 We accurately predicted that only Supreme Court intervention could restore
order.177 While grateful for that small bit of prescience, no one
could have foretold the various directions the instant controversy
would take.178
Having submitted the above for your edification, we are now
able to turn to the circugit conflict, in its variegated form, which
ultimately led to the fresh landmark we now know as Lucia.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5–6.
173 Id. at *12–14.
174 Challenging SEC ALJs, supra note 138, at 378–79.
175 Id. at 378–80.
176 Id. at 369, 386.
177 Id. at 386.
178 To be sure, the preliminary schism that gripped the district courts encompassed additional points of view which, in the interest of conciseness, we need
not address here. See id. at 373–76 (analyzing SEC v. Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d
503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Rakoff, J.)); id. at 380–84 (analyzing Chau v. SEC, 72 F.
Supp. 3d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Kaplan, J.)).
171
172
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IV.ACT TWO: THE CIRCUIT COURTS AVOIDING THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE QUESTION
As already postulated herein above, the essence of this
controversy is the constitutional question as to whether administrative law judges of the SEC are officers of the United States
and attain office in a manner compliant with the Appointments
Clause of Article II. The conventional wisdom has long been that,
for questions of constitutional magnitude, the Supreme Court
typically refrains from asserting its prerogative of review until a
substantial number of the circuit courts of appeals have weighed
in on the issue at hand.
That is not precisely what happened with respect to the
instant controversy.179 To be sure, in a following section, we
shall exposit the two diametrically opposed circuit decisions that
led to the ultimate resolution of Lucia. However, we duly note
that a substantial number of circuit tribunals, when asked to
resolve the very Appointments Clause challenge at the heart of
Lucia, declined to do so.180 These appellate courts essentially
ignored the Article II claim, and resolved the litigation before
them on more prosaic grounds.181
In order to fully comprehend Lucia, we must provide some
discussion of those circuit decisions, since it cannot be denied
they made their own contribution to the abovementioned landmark,
albeit by indirect means. However, because of their contrarian
approach, and the further reason that we do not wish to detract
from Lucia’s true underpinnings, we can be brief in expositing
these cases.
Moreover, these circuits, which chose to resolve their respective cases by means other than resorting to the text of the
Appointments Clause, comprise a fair cross-section of the federal
judiciary.182
Id. at 373, 380, 383.
See Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 825
F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC (Tilton II), 824 F.3d 276, 291
(2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2187 (2017); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d
765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016).
181 See Bennett, 844 F.3d at 176; Hill, 825 F.3d at 1241; Tilton II, 824 F.3d
at 291; Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767.
182 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1171 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016).
179
180
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Chronologically speaking, the first tribunal to be heard
from was the venerable Seventh Circuit.183 In Bebo v. SEC, that
court deflected the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to the authority of a SEC ALJ to hear the proceeding brought against her
by the Commission.184
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Hamilton found that
jurisdiction was lacking, as the plaintiff had not yet exhausted
her options.185 “Bebo will be able to raise her constitutional claims
in this circuit or in the D.C. Circuit” pursuant to the statutory
review scheme provided by Congress.186 Per force, this would include the assertion that the administrative law judge then hearing her case held office in violation of the Appointments Clause.187
Put another way, said the Seventh Circuit, Bebo’s Article II
challenge was preserved until she sought out review by a federal
appeals court.188
Not long after Bebo was decided, the August Second Circuit
added to the dialogue with its holding in Tilton v. SEC189 There
is no need to regurgitate the court’s reasoning here, comprehensive
as it might have been.
Suffice to say, the New York–based tribunal ruled consistently with its brethren in Chicago, finding the plaintiff’s Appointments Clause claim was premature.190 Circuit Judge Sack
opined on behalf of the panel that Tilton, a securities industry
professional, was required to raise her constitutional challenge
See id. at 1171 n.2; see also Bebo, 799 F.3d at 765.
Bebo, 799 F.3d at 765, 767. In that administrative enforcement case, the
SEC charged Bebo, a former CEO, of manipulating her company’s books and records, and making false representations to auditors and the Commission itself.
Notably, the ALJ had yet to rule on the case at the time Bebo filed her lawsuit.
Id. at 767.
185 Id. at 767, 775.
186 Id. at 767–68.
187 Id. at 768.
188 Id. at 774. For the sake of explicitness, the original—and only—panel
decision in Bebo was issued on August 24, 2015. The Seventh Circuit denied
rehearing and rehearing en banc on November 5th of that same year. Id. at 765.
We deem that later ruling as immaterial in fixing a chronology. Accordingly,
Bebo rightfully holds first position, as compared to Jarkesy v. SEC, which was
decided on September 29, 2015. Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
189 Tilton v. SEC (Tilton II), 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2187 (2017).
190 Id. at 291.
183
184
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within the “exclusive” review infrastructure created by Congress.191
In so doing, the Second Circuit likewise did not approach the
Article II issue that was to become the focus of Lucia.192
Consistency was maintained amongst the federal tribunals
with Hill v. SEC,193 a ruling issued only days after Tilton II appeared.194 There, the Eleventh Circuit joined its sister circuits in
declining jurisdiction,195 and directed the subjects of an enforcement
proceeding to first exhaust their rights of review, as provided by
Congress in the statutory scheme of the Exchange Act.196
As the author of the opinion, Circuit Judge Pryor distinguished the case at bar from the “precarious position the Supreme
Court found unacceptable” in Free Enterprise Fund.197 In this
fashion, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the constitutional challenge
brought by Hill pursuant to the Appointments Clause.198
The circle of appellate courts declining to entertain the
constitutional arguments of respondents challenging the power
of SEC ALJs was completed by the Fourth Circuit in Bennett v.
SEC.199 By this late date,200 the cohesion of these geographically
diverse tribunals was such that the unanimous panel commenced
the opinion with a declaration that the Fourth Circuit was now
conjoined with its kin.201 Further discussion exemplifying this
union of the courts of appeals was relegated to a parenthetical.202
As a point of additional interest, Bennett likewise observed
that the plaintiff’s theory of unconstitutionality in the appointment of the Commission’s adjudicators “reads too much into the
Free Enterprise Court’s conclusion,” which this tribunal found was
Id.
Id.
193 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
194 Tilton II was decided June 1, 2016. 824 F.3d at 276. Hill was rendered
on June 17, 2016. 825 F.3d at 1236.
195 Hill, 825 F.3d at 1241.
196 Id. at 1237. As to the underlying case brought by the SEC before the ALJ,
Hill, a real estate developer, was accused of profiting on inside information pertaining to a corporate merger. Id. at 1239.
197 Id. at 1247 (citations omitted).
198 See id. at 1247–48.
199 See generally Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2016).
200 Bennett was issued on December 16, 2016. Id. at 174.
201 Id. at 176.
202 Id. at 183 n.7.
191
192
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factually distinguishable.203 Explicating the last comment, Circuit
Judge Duncan pointed out that “Bennett is already embroiled in
an enforcement proceeding.”204 The plaintiff did not incur any
additional risks by having her constitutional challenge heard as
part and parcel of the nominal statutory review process.205
Thus, as 2016 drew to a close, there was apparent unanimity amongst the circuit courts of appeals on the matter of
Appointments Clause challenges to Commission ALJs holding
office, and presiding over the agency’s enforcement actions.206 After
all, the D.C., Seventh, Second, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits
had held the line, refusing to hear the constitutional complaints
made by the subjects of SEC proceedings.207
By the straightforward expedient of directing such persons to return to the agency’s adjudicators, and counseling that
their Article II claims were preserved there and in the subsequent
review process, nearly half of the Nation’s appellate courts had
successfully—and, one could venture, appropriately—avoided
resolving a question of constitutional magnitude.208
Id. at 182, 186.
Id. at 186. The plaintiff, the founder of an investment firm, was charged by
the Commission with materially misstating assets under management, falsifying performance results, and related securities law violations. Id. at 177.
205 Id. at 186.
206 See supra text accompanying note 204.
207 We relegate to a parenthetical what might otherwise be deemed the pioneering decision of the D.C. Circuit on the controversy at hand, the case captioned
Jarkesy v. SEC. Decided on September 29, 2014, Jarkesy presents a pattern to
be oft-repeated before the federal tribunals in the next year and one half.
Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiff there managed
the general partner of two hedge funds and was accused of securities fraud in
a Commission enforcement proceeding. Id. at 13. Seeking to derail the administrative action by ousting the SEC of jurisdiction, he asserted, inter alia, Due
Process and Equal Protection claims. Id. at 14. Significant to our central purpose here, Jarkesy did not interpose an Appointments Clause challenge to the
ALJ’s power. Therefore, while several tribunals claimed fellowship with the
D.C. Circuit when issuing their own subsequent rulings on the power of SEC
ALJs, in truth Jarkesy never addressed the Article II aspects of the instant
controversy. While the D.C. Circuit is often credited by its brethren as a constittuent member of the then-emerging majority, the fact is Jarkesy is distinguishable, and thus cannot be more than mentioned in passing when discussing the
Appointments Clause challenge that defined the heart of the matter at hand.
208 But see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 375
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (when constitutional questions are unavoidable,
the Court must decide them) (quotations and citations omitted).
203
204
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Yet all that was to change mere days later, as the waning
days of 2016 brought forth the first opposing pole of a controversy, once thought to be dormant, but now entering the full flower
of contentiousness.209 We now come to the limited, but irreconcilable, rift between the circuits which set the stage for Lucia.
V.ACT THREE: TWO CIRCUITS DO BATTLE OVER THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
As already stipulated, a near majority of circuit courts of
appeals had successfully avoided divisiveness by deftly sidestepping the Appointments Clause questions put before them. Then, two
tribunals clashed head on, giving rise to what would eventually
become the Supreme Court’s Article II landmark in Lucia.210
We now examine the two—and only two—appellate decisions that gave rise to the internecine conflict, now concluded, at
least for the time being.
A.Lucia Companies I and II
For reason that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia occupies the apex of this Article, it would be wasteful to expend much
effort in discussing the appellate court decision that was reversed
and remanded by the Justices. Therefore, while reserving the bulk
of our dissertation for the high Court’s reasoning, we note, but
briefly, the holding which preceded the new landmark.
In Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to overturn a Commission
final order imposing sanctions upon an investment adviser.211
The petitioning entities raised the now-familiar Appointments
Clause challenge to the power of the SEC ALJ who initially
heard and decided the underlying enforcement proceeding.212
First, the panel devoted many pages to a detailed analysis
of the statutory predicate for the Commission’s enforcement power,
See generally Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016); Raymond
J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC (Lucia Cos. I), 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition
for review denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
210 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
211 Lucia Cos. I, 832 F.3d at 277.
212 Id. at 280.
209
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its ability to delegate, and the role of its in-house adjudicators.213 Then, turning to the petitioners’ contentions that the
ALJ presiding over their case did not hold office in conformity with
Article II,214 the August tribunal began—and ended—with a
singular observation.
The decisive point here, wrote Circuit Judge Rogers, is
whether the SEC’s administrative law judge had the power to
issue final decisions.215 Since he did not, the panel ruled the
agency’s in-house jurist was not an officer of the United States,
and thus there was no constitutional infirmity in the manner in
which the ALJ took office.216
The tribunal found it conclusive that the full Commission
“retained full decision-making powers,” and that body “alone
issues final orders.”217 As simple as that, the D.C. Circuit handily
refuted the Appointments Clause claim.218
Nearly an entire year passed before the D.C. Circuit issued the penultimate decree which primed the matter for final
Id. at 281–83.
Id. at 283–85.
215 See id. at 285.
216 See id. Contra Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2017),
where the Fifth Circuit stayed the order of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ALJ on the grounds that the adjudicator attained office in violation
of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 299, 304. Duly noting Lucia Cos. I and II, the
tribunal took cognizance of the intercircuit rift. Id. at 300–01. Holding that the
ALJ employed by the banking regulator exercised all the attributes of an officer of the United States, albeit as an inferior office-holder, the southerly circuit
had no difficulty in finding the lack of compliance with the Appointments
Clause nullified the adjudicator’s directive. Id. at 302–03. Writing for the
panel, Circuit Judge Owen, as joined by Judges Jones and Clement of that
prestigious bench, opined the fact that ALJs are often directed and supervised by a superior is “more relevant to the distinction between principal and
inferior officers.” It does not, however, diminish one bit the appointee’s Article II status as an officer of some stripe. Id. at 303 (quotation and footnote
omitted). It can be stated that Burgess is firmly grounded in the notion that
the ability of an appointee to render final decisions on behalf of the United
States has relevance to distinguishing principal officers from inferior officers
but has no bearing on differentiating officers of either classification from mere
employees. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1997).
217 Lucia Cos. I, 823 F.3d at 286.
218 The remainder of Lucia Cos. I likewise rejected the petitioners’ challenges to the finding of liability and choice of sanctions decreed by the SEC’s
ALJ. Id. at 289–96.
213
214
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adjudication by the Supreme Court.219 In a per curium judgment,
“an equally divided court” denied further review at the circuit
level.220 The case at bar was now ready to be placed before the
Nation’s highest tribunal.221
But first, it needed a conflicting ruling to be set in opposition. A panel of a circuit court nearly fifteen hundred miles distant
from the Nation’s capital soon provided the necessary counterpoint,
and it is that contrarian view that we exposit next.222
B.Bandimere
Bandimere v. SEC came before the courts much like the
cases which preceded it.223 The SEC alleged that David F.
Bandimere, a Colorado businessman, had breached various federal securities laws.224 An administrative law judge assigned by
the Commission presided over the enforcement proceeding, ruled
Bandimere was liable as charged, and assessed various punishments against the respondent, including a lifetime ban from
securities industry.225
The full Commission essentially confirmed the decision of
its ALJ, while simultaneously rejecting Bandimere’s Appointments
Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC (Lucia Cos II), 868 F.3d 1021, 1021
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
220 Id. at 1021.
221 The denial of further review by the en banc court exemplified the conventional wisdom “that the D.C. Circuit is a ‘AAA baseball team for the Supreme Court’s major league.’” Fred Lucas, Here’s What Happened the Last Time
Democrats Tried to Deny Brett Kavanaugh a Court Seat, THE DAILY SIGNAL
(July 10, 2018), https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/07/10/heres-what-happened
-the-last-time-democrats-tried-to-deny-kavanaugh-a-court-seat [https://perma
.cc/FTY6-5BHT] (quoting Professor Anthony Michael Sabino). Lucia Cos. II
was adjudged by, among others, then–Circuit Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, and
Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, mentioned as a possible high Court nominee.
Not participating in the denial of review was D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick
B. Garland, nominated to the Supreme Court in the waning days of the Obama
Administration. Lucia Cos. II, 868 F.3d at 1021.
222 See generally Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
223 Id. Bandimere was decided on December 27, 2016. Id. at 1168. Even including intervening holidays, the Tenth Circuit issued its ruling less than two
weeks after the Fourth Circuit issued Bennett. Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174,
174 (4th Cir. 2016).
224 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171.
225 Id.
219
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Clause challenge.226 Upon the respondent’s petition for review,227 the controversy was submitted to the Tenth Circuit for
further adjudication.228
The Tenth Circuit pronounced its judgment without equivo229
cation. In only the second paragraph of its opinion, and citing
solely to Freytag, this western tribunal firmly declared that the ALJ
who heard Bandimere’s case “was not constitutionally appointed,
[and] held his office in violation of the Appointments Clause.”230
Circuit Judge Matheson commenced the analysis with an
overview of the Appointments Clause.231 The proviso, he noted,
“embodies both separation of powers and checks and balances.”232
In addition, the Appointments Clause assures accountability, by
establishing the vital chain between those appointed and the
elected officials who bestowed the office.233 Relying upon the very
words of Freytag, the Bandimere court emphasized these constraints upon the appointment power were the best guarantee that
the machinery of government would be accountable to the will of
the People.234
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(y)(a)(1).
228 Bandimere, 844 F.3d. at 1171. As explained previously herein, it was
Bandimere’s option to seek review before the D.C. Circuit or the Tenth, the latter
sitting in Denver. Being a Coloradan, the respondent made the obvious choice of
the tribunal closest to his home. But he chose wisely, since he thereby avoided
the tribunal from which Jarkesy and Lucia Cos. I emanated, rulings far less
favorable to his position.
229 Id. at 1170.
230 Id. Bandimere opens with these cogent historical observations. It postulated that the Framers could not have foreseen the creature of the administrative law judge, and, better still, such an appointee presiding at securities
law enforcement hearings. Nor could the Founders have imagined an Executive
Branch comprised of more than four million people, most of them employees,
but some of that bureaucratic army standing apart as officers of the United
States, be they principal or inferior office-holders “who must be appointed under
the Appointments Clause.” Id. at 1170 (citation omitted).
231 Id. at 1172–73.
232 Id. at 1172; see also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1985) (“The
Clause is a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of
another.”).
233 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1172. In various parentheticals, Judge Matheson
looked to the Federalist documents for supplementary discussion of separation
of powers, accountability, and checking the President’s authority to populate
the Executive Branch. Id. at 1172 nn.5–6.
234 Id. at 1173 (quotation and citation omitted).
226
227
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There followed an in-depth discussion of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding those persons found to constitute
inferior officers of the United States, and an extensive cataloging
of those positions.235 This was set in counterpoise to Freytag,236
then punctuated by a notation that SEC ALJs are permitted to
take office via the Administrative Procedure Act,237 and are the
proper delegates of the Commission’s lawful functions, pursuant
to the 1934 Exchange Act.238 Possibly most telling in this discourse
was the concession by the agency that “its ALJs are not appointed
by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department.”239
All this inexorably led to the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion
that, as decreed in Freytag, SEC administrative law judges are
inferior officers of the United States, and they must therefore
attain their rank via a process congruent with the Appointments
Clause.240 Since the adjudicator in Bandimere’s case had not,
the respondent possessed a valid Article II claim.241 But the
Tenth Circuit had one more critical piece of business to attend
to. The tribunal was required to address the contrary outcome
reached by the D.C. Circuit in Lucia Cos. I.242
Writing for this western appeals court, Circuit Judge
Matheson promptly disposed of the matter.243 He opined that the
appellate bench residing in the Nation’s capital had concluded
Id. at 1173–74.
Id. at 1174–76.
237 Id. at 1174.
238 Id. at 1177.
239 Id. at 1176.
240 Id. at 1179, 1181.
241 Id. at 1179. Circuit Judge Matheson then summarized the characteristics of the Commission’s in-house judges which compelled categorizing them as
officers pursuant to the Freytag inquiry. First, the office of SEC ALJ is established by statute. Id. Second, those same provisos set forth the duties, salaries,
and means of appointment of those adjudicators. Id. Third, and most decisive
as to the issue of proper classification, “SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion”
in presiding over enforcement proceedings brought by the agency. Id. Among
other things, these appointees supervise discovery, hear testimony, rule on motions, preside over hearings, and then issue initial decisions that might well
transform into final action sanctioned by the Commission. Id. at 1179–80. “In
sum,” concluded Circuit Judge Matheson, “SEC ALJs closely resemble the STJs
described in Freytag,” in the main because they exercise important adjudicative functions, not mere ministerial tasks. Id. at 1181.
242 Id. at 1182.
243 Id.
235
236
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SEC ALJs are employees, not officers of the United States, primarily because the agency’s administrative law judges cannot
render final decisions.244
“We disagree,” stated the Tenth Circuit, indicating that
the finality (or purportedly lack thereof) of an ALJ’s ruling is not
dispositive.245 Once more, and again invoking the teachings of
Freytag, the Bandimere panel deemed the totality of circumstances surrounding the SEC’s ALJs, how they took office, the
authority they possessed, and, again most especially, the significant discretion they exercised in adjudicating securities law cases,
decreed that these persons were indeed officers of the United
States.246 In this thoughtful manner, the Tenth Circuit brought
forth the essence of the disagreement amongst the two warring
circuits that would soon occupy the Supreme Court.
So Bandimere concluded finding that SEC ALJs were, in
truth, officers of the United States, yet they attained office unconstitutionally, for reason that the rigors of the Appointments
Clause had not been satisfied.247 Accordingly, the Commission’s
final rendering against this respondent was overturned due to
that constitutional defect.248 Now the die was cast, and a final
showdown before the Nation’s highest Court appeared to be a
foregone conclusion.249
Id.
Id. at 1182; accord Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir.
2017) (appointee still qualifies as an officer even if she lacks final decisionmaking authority).
246 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179–81 (10th Cir. 2016).
247 Id. at 1181–82.
248 Id. at 1188.
249 A few brief notes regarding the supplemental opinions in Bandimere
are helpful to our continued understanding of the magnitude of the constitutional issue revealed herein. In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Briscoe
emphasized the structural significance of the Appointments Clause, as it “tether[s] key personnel ... to the sovereign power of the United States, and thus to
the people.” Id. at 1188 (Briscoe, J., concurring). Concomitantly, he stressed
that the tribunal’s opinion today does not place every ALJ in every federal
agency in jeopardy, primarily because Freytag, the keystone to the panel’s
reasoning, made no such sweeping pronouncements. Id. at 1188–89 (Briscoe,
J., concurring). In sharp contrast, the dissent penned by Circuit Judge McKay
warned of repercussions from the majority’s holding, describing it as endangering the status of nearly two thousand ALJs at sundry federal agencies,
and potentially invalidating hundreds of thousands of decisions made annually. Id. at 1194, 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting).
244
245
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C.Petitioning for Supreme Court Review
In ordinary circumstances, commentators have little or no
need to discuss the petition for certiorari stage of a case which
subsequently evolves into a Supreme Court landmark. But Lucia’s
path to the high bench was somewhat exceptional, and therefore
deserving of a few words of explanation.
Very briefly, Mr. Lucia’s plea for high Court review assumed the shape one would expect, given his losses in the court
below.250 He posited the salient question rather straightforwardly:
“Whether administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are Officers of the United States within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause.”251
Far more remarkable was his advocacy contending the
matter was ripe for review. Mr. Lucia characterized the division
between Bandimere and his own case as an “intractable” circuit
split.252 Arguably correct, vis-à-vis the two tribunals in question;
yet it failed to take cognizance of the many other circuits that
were not so diametrically opposed.253
Nor did this petitioner brook any intermediate outcomes.
Mr. Lucia foresaw only one resolution.254 “The question presented
is binary; one of those two decisions must be wrong.”255 Certainly,
nothing unusual in a petitioner’s strident advocacy, but remarkable nonetheless for its unwillingness to admit to any alternative holding.
Finally, Mr. Lucia, as the petitioner, boldly proclaimed his
case was the ideal vehicle to resolve the extant Appointments
Clause controversy.256 Among other things, he asserted the SEC
had “dramatically increased” by both “number and proportion” the
enforcement proceedings it placed before its in-house adjudicators, while simultaneously diminishing its resort to the district
courts,257 that, notwithstanding over a dozen similar cases, only
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018)
(No. 17-130) [hereinafter Lucia Petition for Certiorari].
251 Id.
252 Id. at 2.
253 See id. at 8–9.
254 See id. at 19.
255 Id. at 19 (emphasis in the original).
256 Id. at 32.
257 Id. at 33.
250
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Lucia and Bandimere collided head-on over the constitutional question at the appellate level.258 And lastly, striking a note of impending disaster, Mr. Lucia pleaded that this disarray amongst
the trial adjudicators, be they judicial or administrative actors,
could only increase until the high Court restored harmony.259
And how did the respondent SEC react to all this? With
pardons for stating the obvious, the litigant which prevailed in
the court below typically resists certiorari, and vigorously opposes
any modification of the outcome obtained from the lower tribunal.260
Not so in Lucia. The sea change brought about by the immediately prior presidential election caused both the Solicitor General, Noel J. Francisco, and the SEC, his nominal client, to
abandon the D.C. Circuit’s rulings favorable to the agency in Lucia
Cos. I and II.261 The government now urged the high Court to reverse the rulings below, on the grounds that the Commission’s
ALJs were, in truth, officers of the United States.262 Therefore,
petitioner and respondent agreed that the agency’s in-house adjudicators had attained office in contravention of the Appointments Clause.263
But there was more to come from the government. Not only
did the United States ask the Supreme Court to renounce its victory
before the D.C. Circuit, it appended a further request to this 180
degree change in direction.264 The government now requested that
the high Court “address whether the restrictions imposed by statute on [the] removal [of the Commission’s ALJs] are consistent
with the constitutionality prescribed separation of powers.”265
In short, the respondent not only joined Mr. Lucia’s argument as to the unconstitutional appointment of the SEC’s in-house
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
260 See UNITED STATES COURTS (Aug. 31, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.us
courts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-out
reach/activity-resources/supreme-1 [https://perma.cc/E4GV-5X6M].
261 See Cristian Farias, Noel Francisco, Trump’s Tenth Justice, THE NEW
YORK REPORT OF BOOKS: NYR DAILY (Aug. 29, 2019, 9:04 PM), https://www
.nybooks.com/daily/2018/08/09/noel-francisco-trumps-tenth-justice/ [https://perma
.cc/R4ZV-MGMV].
262 Brief for the Respondent at 9–10, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018)
(No. 17-130) (November 2017) [hereinafter SEC Certiorari Brief].
263 Id. at 14, 18.
264 Id. at 21.
265 Id.
258
259
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adjudicators, it added a separate challenge to the laws that immunized these jurists from at-will removal by the Chief Executive.266
Finally, for reason of the government’s refutation of the
D.C. Circuit’s holdings below, the Solicitor General urged the Justices to appoint an amicus curiae to defend the now orphaned
decision of the lower tribunal.267
Once the government reversed its position, it stayed the
new course. Subsequent to the grant of review, the United States
continued to concur with the petitioner that the Commission’s
ALJs are officers of the United States within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause.268 Implicitly then, the government continued to espouse the opinion that the agency’s in-house adjudicators attained office in derogation of Article II’s mandates.
The additional challenge respecting removal was refined
in further briefing, as follows: “whether the statutory restraints
on removing [the ALJs] from office unconstitutionally impair the
President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws.”269 In other
words, if the appointment of the SEC’s administrative law judges
was constitutionally defective, a fortiori any encumbrance upon
the Chief Executive’s prerogative to remove those adjudicators
at will was likewise constitutionally flawed.270
See also id. at 18.
Id. at 10. The government’s about-face also engendered financial repercussions, which have yet to be resolved. The prestigious law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, which represented Mr. Lucia pro bono, has asked the United States
to pay more than $800,000 for legal fees incurred in securing the petitioner’s
victory. Filing a fee application with the D.C. Circuit, the law firm cites the
provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act, a statute which entitles a prevailing party to fees and other expenses unless the government’s position is
substantially justified. Undoubtedly, this petition for the reimbursement of
Mr. Lucia’s fees “will place new scrutiny [on] the government’s changed position”
before the Supreme Court. See Coyle, Gibson Dunn Fee Petition Puts New Focus
on DOJ Switched Position in SCOTUS, 206 N.Y. L.J. at p. 2, cl. 4 (Dec. 18, 2018).
See generally Anthony Michael Sabino, And Unequal Justice for All—Bankruptcy
Court Jurisdiction under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV.
453, 458–62 (1992) (analyzing the Equal Access to Justice Act, its purpose, history,
and statutory provisions).
268 Reply Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 1, Lucia v. SEC,
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.
868 (1991)) [hereinafter SEC Reply Brief].
269 Id. at 2.
270 One can only admire the government’s commitment to its newfound position. Yet, we are left to ponder, given the confluence of events, if the government’s
urging of this separate question upon the Justices was influenced by PHH I,
266
267
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Mr. Lucia and the United States were in accord on an additional matter of some significance. As the preceding discussion
informs us, while the discord between the D.C. and Tenth Circuits
on the Appointments Clause issue was quite obvious, a nearmajority of other tribunals had avoided the constitutional question entirely.271
Therefore, a question remained: was this limited conflict
sufficiently ripe to merit high Court review? Notably, on that point
the government again agreed with Mr. Lucia.272 The Solicitor General concurred that the petitioner’s case was the superior medium
for resolution of the Appointments Clause challenge; accordingly,
it asked that Bandimere be held in abeyance.273
One last wrinkle was added to the mix prior to the Supreme Court consenting to contemplate the internecine conflict.
While the petition for certiorari was pending, the Commission
ratified the appointment of all its ALJs, including the agency
adjudicator who initially heard the enforcement proceeding
against Mr. Lucia.274
It is a fair supposition that the SEC undertook this remedial step for reasons other than influencing the eventual outcome in Lucia. Far more practical, the Commission most likely
promulgated this blanket ratification in order to preserve the
authority of its in-house adjudicators in pending and future cases,
and steel the results reached by their current deliberations against
further constitutional challenges.
and the controversy raised in that proceeding over the Chief Executive’s authority
to remove a key official in a kindred regulatory body. PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I),
839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
271 Brief for Anthony Michael Sabino as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11–12, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (arguing for denying review given that the majority of circuits had yet to rule on
the Appointments Clause question).
272 SEC Certiorari Brief, supra note 262, at 24.
273 Id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, SEC v. Bandimere 844
F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 17-475). One week after the Court decided
Lucia, it tied off loose ends by formally declining review of Bandimere. SEC v.
Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706
(2018). Moreover, Justice Gorsuch took no part in that decision, as he once
called the Tenth Circuit home. See id.
274 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Order (Aug. 26, 2019, 8:00
PM), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2017/33-10440.pdf [https://perma
.cc/PDQ5-TCRD].
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Certainly, it would be excessive to classify as unprecedented the events immediately preceding the high Court’s grant
of review in Lucia. Rather, let us categorize them as unusual,
insofar as the government, the victor in the proceedings below,
now effectively wished the ruling in its favor to be reversed.
Adding to the intrigue was the United States positing an
additional question for the Justices to review.275 Clearly, the
respondent recognized the utility of Lucia, not only to scrutinize
the constitutional validity of the appointment of the SEC’s ALJs,
but to examine the companionable question of whether the present
barriers to the Chief Executive’s removal of the agency’s adjudicators would survive an Appointments Clause test.276 Against this
somewhat unusual backdrop, Lucia was at last ready for disposition by the high Court.
VI.ACT FOUR: THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES LUCIA
The particulars having now been set forth herein above, it
is time to review the actual decision of the Supreme Court in
Lucia. To be sure, the Court ably resolved the constitutional
challenge to the power of SEC ALJs, while adding to its stock of
Appointments Clause jurisprudence. Yet, as shall be discussed
later on, the high Court’s holding, while resolving the controversy
at hand, might well have presaged future Article II challenges to
the vast federal bureaucracy.
The Court’s summary of the facts was brief; in fact, surprisingly so.277 It quickly noted the Commission’s allegations that
Mr. Lucia misled investors with his “Buckets of Money” strategy,
administrative proceedings were presided over by an ALJ, and
the adjudicator ruled against the respondent.278
With similar alacrity, that Court took cognizance of the
petitioner’s claim that the ALJ held office in violation of the Appointments Clause, the full Commission rejected his assertion,
and thereafter a panel of the D.C. Circuit sided with the SEC.279
SEC Reply Brief, supra note 268, at 20–21.
See id.
277 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–50 (2018).
278 Id. at 2049–50.
279 Id. at 2050.
275
276
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Few words were spared to note the en banc split of the entire
D.C. tribunal.280
Shockingly terse was the notation that the D.C. Circuit’s
affirmance in Lucia conflicted with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Bandimere.281 No discussion of Bandimere followed.282 Nor did the
Lucia Court even mention the differing approaches of the many
other circuits wherein the power of SEC ALJs was challenged.283
Instead, the high bench was content to characterize the
internecine conflict as a split between those two circuit courts
alone, effectively adopting Mr. Lucia’s posture as to the question
to be resolved.284 Indeed, the Court did spare a few words to note
the government’s about-face on the controversy, and, more importantly, to praise the amicus curiae appointed by the high
Court to defend the judgment below.285 The preliminaries thus
disposed of in summary fashion, the high bench moved on to the
substance of the controversy.
Justice Kagan minced no words in pronouncing the issue
to be resolved.286 “The sole question here,” she declared, is
whether the administrative law judges of the SEC are “‘Officers
of the United States’ or simply employees of the Federal Government.”287 After positing the essence of the Appointments Clause,
the learned jurist acknowledged the undisputed fact that the ALJ
who decided the petitioner’s case was assigned to the task by the
SEC staff, and not the Commission itself.288
This led to a crucial observation by Justice Kagan. If it was
decided that the ALJs were, in fact, “officers” of the United States,
Mr. Lucia’s claim of a constitutional violation was indeed valid.289
See id.
See id. (citing Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (2016)).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 2050.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 2050–51. The amicus curiae appointed to defend the D.C. Circuit’s
decision was Anton Metlitsky, a former law clerk to Chief Justice John G. Roberts.
Id. at 2051 n.2; see also Anton Metlitsky, O’MELVENY, https://www.omm.com
/professsionals/anton-metlitsky/ [https://perma.cc/JVL6-23DZ].
286 Id. at 2051.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
280
281
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Then “[t]he only way to defeat his position” was to hold the Commission’s adjudicators were “non-officer employees” or, put another way, “‘lesser functionaries’ in the Government’s workforce.”290
In order to resolve this weighty constitutional question,
the Court first established a framework for decision, that structure anchored by two fundamental landmarks.291 The first such
cornerstone reached back nearly one hundred and forty years
ago, to Reconstruction Era America. In United States v. Germaine,292 the high bench classified doctors hired by the federal
government to administer physical examinations as “mere employees” because the work they performed was but occasional or
temporary, not continuing or permanent.293 Germaine was thus
emplaced to occupy one end of the spectrum.
The other anchorage was occupied by Buckley v. Valeo,
well-known as one of the Court’s more illustrious exercises in
constitutional jurisprudence in the latter half of the twentieth
century.294 Justice Kagan stressed the importance of Buckley to
the matter at hand, as the former “set out another requirement,
central to [Lucia].”295
Buckley held that members of a federal commission qualified
as “officers” for reason that they “exercis[ed] significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States.”296 As summarized by
the Lucia court, the appropriate inquiry here must focus upon
“the extent of power an individual wields in carrying out his
assigned functions.”297
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)).
Id.
292 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879).
293 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (citing Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12) (quotations omitted).
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
297 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051. As the Court relegated it to a footnote, likewise
we shall treat the following in a mere parenthetical. Not at issue in the instant
case was the distinction between “principal” and “inferior” officers. Id. at n.3 (citing
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1997)). Pursuant to the Appointments Clause, the former can only be appointed by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate; the latter may be appointed by the President, the courts
or the heads of departments, if Congress so provides for the alternate procedure.
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
290
291
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The Court was clearly motivated to establish these foundation stones because the government, among others, sought an
elaboration upon Buckley’s articulation of the “significant authority” test.298 Yet the Justices refuted the request, declaring
“that project unnecessary.”299
Rather, the Court looked to another decision along the
spectrum established by Germaine and Buckley, the case entitled
Freytag v. Commissioner.300 The Justices found Freytag instructive
here, for reasons that it applied the “significant authority” test of
Buckley, without adornment, to adjudicators “who are near-carbon
copies” to the ALJs in the SEC’s service.301 Indeed, the Lucia Court
pronounced that the Freytag theorem “necessarily decides” the
case at bar.302
As recapitulated by Justice Kagan, Freytag concerned the
constitutional status (or lack thereof) of the “special trial judges”
of the United States Tax Court.303 Referred to by the Court as
STJs for sake of brevity, the authority of these adjudicators varied from controversy to controversy.304 They could conclusively
decide relatively minor matters on behalf of the Tax Court.305
Yet in more significant cases, a STJ was delimited to submitting
proposed findings and rulings to a Tax Court judge for further
review, and, presumably, a final judgment.306
Specific to Freytag, the disputed tax deficiency was a billion and a half dollars, a major proceeding indeed.307 Understandably, the STJ conducted in excess of three months of hearings.308
When the Tax Court jurist adopted the specialist’s draft decision
as his own, the aggrieved taxpayer challenged the ruling on the
See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.
Id. The Court pointedly added that “maybe one day” the need to refine
Buckley shall arise, but “that day is not this one.” Id. Admittedly, a neat rebuff
by Justice Kagan.
300 Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
301 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 873).
306 Id. (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 873).
307 Id.
308 Id.
298
299
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constitutional ground that the STJ did not hold office in conformity with the Appointments Clause.309
In relating Freytag to the matter at hand, Justice Kagan
emphasized that the Court in the former case emphasized the
significance of the duties of office exercised by the STJs.310 Now
writing for the high bench in Lucia, the Court’s third newest Justice
stressed Freytag’s reliance upon the fact that these tax specialists took testimony, ruled on evidentiary matters, and conducted
proceedings.311 In doing so, these adjudicators exercised broad
discretion.312 “That fact meant they were officers, even when their
decisions were not final,” Lucia declared.313
That summary of Freytag given, the Lucia majority reiterated that it now possessed everything necessary to decide the
instant case.314 It found that, similar to the Tax Court’s specialist
judges, the Commission’s ALJs “hold a continuing office established
by law,” a fact undisputed by any party, most probably because an
administrative law judge’s appointment, salary, and duties are
clearly defined by statute.315
Moreover, the SEC’s in-house jurists exercise significant discretion and perform important functions.316 Justice Kagan pronounced they hold “all the authority needed to ensure fair and
orderly adversarial hearings,” much like Article III judges.317
Once more, Lucia catalogued these essential attributes of
judicial power as the ability to administer oaths, take testimony,
examine witnesses, rule on motions, conduct trials, and enforce
compliance with their directives.318 “So point for point,” in drawing
Id.
Id.
311 Id.
312 Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)).
313 Id. In a footnote, Lucia makes brief mention that the Freytag Court also
proffered the view that, since it was conceded by the government that STJs
could enter final judgment in smaller cases, “it made no sense” for the Justices
then to categorize these jurists as officers in some proceedings, but not in others.
Id. at n.4. The majority was no doubt compelled to address this facet in a parenthetical in order to deflect a related point made in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent.
Id. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 2053.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 2053.
318 Id.
309
310
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comparisons between STJs and the SEC’s ALJs, Justice Kagan
found both sets of adjudicators held “equivalent duties and powers” in the course of completing their assigned tasks.319
Lastly, the Commission’s administrative law judges, much
like their fellows in Freytag, issue decisions—“except with potentially more independent effect.”320 The Lucia majority noted that
in a major case a Tax Court judge must always review a STJ’s
proposed findings.321 In contradistinction, if the full Commission
declines to review the conclusion of one of its own ALJs, then the
jurist’s decision becomes final and is backed by the full weight of
the SEC.322 In other words, declared Justice Kagan, “the [Commission] ALJ can play the more autonomous role.”323
Characterizing that attribute as a “last-word capacity,” the
majority deemed it inescapable that the case at bar must fall
into alignment with Freytag.324 “If the Tax Court STJs are officers,
as Freytag held, then the Commission’s ALJs must be too.”325
To reinforce that holding, Lucia turned to various assertions made in support of viewing the agency’s adjudicators as
ordinary employees.326 One was that the SEC’s ALJs seemingly
lack the power to punish contempt; the second, that the Commission’s rules require no deference by the ruling body to an
administrative law judge’s findings.327
The Court would have none of it.328 Even lacking in the
formal authority to punish contempt of court, a SEC jurist is
nevertheless empowered to shape proceedings in such a manner
as to assure compliance with the adjudicator’s edicts, said the
high bench.329
Not the least of these “conventional weapons,” as so poetically described by Justice Kagan, is the ALJ’s ultimate power to
issue an opinion, which the full Commission can very well adopt
Id.
Id.
321 Id. at 2053–54.
322 Id. at 2053.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 2054.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
319
320
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in toto.330 That capability constitutes sufficient and “substantial
informal power to ensure the parties stay in line.”331
The second argument, pertaining to the standard of oversight applied to an administrative law judge’s decision, fared no
better.332 The standard of subsequent review was of no moment
to Freytag’s Appointments Clause analysis, found Justice Kagan,
and so it should not be conclusive in Lucia.333 In any event, held the
Court, the SEC often accords deference to its adjudicators, particularly with regard to matters of fact-finding and credibility.334
Apparently accepting as true the counter-assertion that the
Commission employs a generally deferential standard when sitting
in review of its ALJs, Justice Kagan deemed it nearly automatic
that the full SEC would rarely upset the holdings of its adjudicatory
staff.335 In all, the Court found the distinction drawn to “make no
difference for officer status” in an Article II inquiry.336 And so, the
majority disposed of the last obstacle to its ultimate declaration.
Combining its own reasoning in the case at bar with the
rationale previously espoused in Freytag, the Lucia Court declared
that the Commission’s administrative law judges are “officers of
the United States,” subject to the strictures of the Appointments
Clause of Article II.337 And since the prerequisites of that constitutional proviso had not been complied with, the SEC’s ALJs held
office in an unconstitutional manner.338
The substance of its holding thus delivered, the high bench
then turned to the best remedy for the constitutional defect that
now lay exposed. Justice Kagan commenced with the precept that
a party who timely challenges the constitutional validity of the appointment of the adjudicator hearing his case is entitled to relief.339 The Court speedily moved to answer the obvious question
of what relief accordingly flows from said principle. Justice Kagan
Id.
Id.
332 Id. at 2054–55.
333 Id. at 2054.
334 Id. at 2054–55.
335 Id. at 2055.
336 Id. at 2054.
337 Id. at 2055.
338 Id.
339 Id. (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995)).
330
331
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readily replied that the most appropriate remedy is a new hearing
before a constitutionally appointed official.340 But here the Court
imposed an additional requirement to remediate Mr. Lucia’s constitutional injury.341
The Court decreed that the administrative law judge who
originally heard the petitioner’s case was prohibited from presiding
at any renewed enforcement proceedings.342 The Court ordered that
a new ALJ properly appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause oversee all subsequent hearings.343 Justice Kagan postulated that the first adjudicator “cannot be expected to consider
the matter as though he had not adjudicated it before.”344 To be
sure, the majority found that, even if the first jurist was subsequently appointed in a manner compliant with Article II, that
remediation would nonetheless be insufficient to expunge the taint
of the prior constitutional infirmity.345
The sanctity of the Appointments Clause having been upheld, and the appropriate remedy accorded to the petitioner, the
Supreme Court brought Lucia to a close. Standing above all else
was the Court’s unequivocal declarations that the administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission were
officers of the United States, and they could constitutionally
hold office if they were appointed in a manner compliant with
the Appointments Clause of Article II.346 Since the ALJ presiding over Mr. Lucia’s proceeding had not, the decision adverse to
the petitioner was reversed and the enforcement proceeding against
him was remanded.347
Id.
Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id. The majority’s edict in this regard balanced principled decision-making
with pragmatism. As to the first, the Court noted that barring the first adjudicator from rehearings fostered timely Appointments Clause challenges, thereby
better serving the objectives of that constitutional mandate. Id. at 2055 n.5. As
to the second, the availability of other SEC ALJs, and, indeed, the full Commission itself, rendered the Court’s mandate for a new adjudicator a simple
instruction, one easily obeyed. Id. at 2055 n.5.
346 Id. at 2055.
347 Id. at 2056. The Court wisely refrained from addressing Lucia’s further
claim that the Commission’s recent order ratifying the appointment of all its
ALJs did nothing to solve the constitutional defect. Aside from the implicit
340
341
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Before departing Lucia entirely, note must be taken of the
concurring opinion therein of Justice Thomas.348 Justice Thomas’s
approach to the case at bar was most intriguing. He readily
agreed that Lucia was “indistinguishable” from Freytag.349 Yet
that was not enough, he declared.350 Looking to the next test of
Article II and beyond, Justice Thomas postulated that “this Court
will not be able to decide every Appointments Clause case by
comparing it to Freytag.”351 The learned Justice’s concern was
rooted in his perception that “our precedents in this area do not
provide much guidance.”352
Justice Thomas characterized Freytag as instructing what
suffices to qualify someone as an officer of the United States, but
Freytag and its fellows “have never clearly defined what is necessary” to declare that an office-holder has attained the vaunted
constitutional status of an “officer[ ] of the United States.”353
To end this deficiency, Justice Thomas proposed an examination of the Appointments Clause grounded upon original meaning.354 To that end, the concurring opinion commenced with the
obligation of an ongoing statutory duty as the foremost defining
attribute of an officer of the United States.355
Turning to the constitutional text, Justice Thomas affirms
that the Appointments Clause provides the “exclusive process”
for appointing officers of the United States.356 A subroutine of the
mandatory procedure is the alternative methodology for appointing
point that the question was not yet ripe for the high Court’s review (and it might
never be), the majority parenthetically pointed out the several possibilities: the
full Commission might hear Lucia’s case on the remand; a new ALJ might be the
beneficiary of a constitutional appointment; or, in a truth left unspoken by the
Court, another method of achieving compliance with Article II might be employed.
Id. at 2055 n.6. At the end of the day, there was no good reason to reach that
sub-issue, and the Court rightly left it alone.
348 Id. at 2056–57 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch joined in Justice
Thomas’s concurrence.
349 Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id.
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“inferior” officers of the United States.357 Here, noted Justice
Thomas, Article II “strikes a balance between efficiency and
accountability.”358
In contradistinction to principal officers, who must endure
the arduous process of presidential nomination and Senate ratification, a strictly limited number of governmental actors are
empowered to appoint junior officers without the rigors of senatorial hearings and oversight.359 While accommodating of “the
sheer number of inferior officers” in service to the Nation, this
alternative process nonetheless “maintains clear lines of accountability” to the People.360 Those are the procedures, and the more
practical reasons behind them, according to Justice Thomas.361
Turning to the original meaning of the pivotal terminology,
Justice Thomas hypothesized that the Founders most likely perceived officers of the United States to be those “who perform an
ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how important or significant
the duty.”362 Furthermore, Founding Era documentation reflects
a generally held belief that the obligations of these federal officers were duties established and defined by statute.363
His journey to the original meaning of the terms in question now complete, Justice Thomas applied them to the case at
bar. He opined that the SEC’s administrative law judges “easily
qualify” as officers of the United States.364 Setting aside the relative importance or significance of their duties, Judge Thomas
declared “[a]ll that matters is that the [ALJs] are continuously
responsible for performing them.”365 That was conclusive, in the
estimation of the veteran Justice.
For these reasons, Justice Thomas joined the majority in
its opinion, firmly convinced “the original meaning of the Appointments Clause” inevitably points to the determination that
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
Id.
359 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
360 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring); THE FEDERALIST NO.
76, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
361 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
362 Id.
363 Id. at 2057 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
364 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
365 Id. at 2057.
357
358
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the Commission’s adjudicators are officers of the United States,
precisely because they are charged with fulfilling ongoing statutory duties.366 And, since the agency’s ALJs lacked a proper Appointments Clause pedigree, their holding of office amounted to
an irremediable constitutional violation.367
Our analysis of Lucia does not end here. Equally worthy
of contemplation is the opinion of Justice Breyer, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.368 We posit this for
reason of Justice Breyer’s differing methodology, and his focus
upon certain aspects of this Appointments Clause controversy
which the majority did not address directly.
Foremost in Justice Breyer’s approach was his stated inclination to resolve the instant case upon statutory, and not constitutional, grounds.369 This preference was rooted in his grave
concern that the case at bar necessarily involved the resolution
of “a different, embedded constitutional question,” that companion
issue being “the constitutionality of the statutory ‘for cause’ removal protections Congress afforded administrative law judges.”370
It is a “well approved principle of constitutional and statutory construction that the power of removal of executive officers [is] incidental to the power of appointment.”371 No doubt, the
Justice’s caution arose from the fact of the Solicitor General’s
change in position on the basic Appointments Clause question
initially raised by the petitioner, which compelled the United
States to urge the high Court to resolve this secondary constitutional controversy.372
To be sure, Justice Breyer was in concert with the majority’s
holding that the Commission’s ALJs attain office in contravention of the Appointments Clause.373 Yet, as aforesaid, his path to
Id.
Id.
368 Id. at 2057 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined Justice Breyer, but solely insofar
as they agreed with him that Lucia’s case could be remanded to the same administrative law judge, and naming a new adjudicator was unnecessary. Id. at
2057, 2067.
369 Id. at 2057.
370 Id.
371 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926).
372 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050.
373 Id. at 2057 (Breyer, J., concurring).
366
367
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that same conclusion commenced with statutory law, precisely,
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).374 Justice Breyer found
it critical that the administrative law judge designated in Lucia
(and his peers elsewhere) was appointed by the SEC staff, not
the Commission itself.375
Justice Breyer contended that the APA, correctly read, bestows the appointive power in the Commission, itself a collective
head of a department, a status in harmony with the explicit text of
the Appointments Clause.376 By virtue of investing that prerogative
in the full body, the statute concomitantly forbids its delegation
to the agency’s staff.377 Such an interpretation of the relevant
statute, opined the Justice, avoids the more troublesome constitutional question.378
Intriguingly, Justice Breyer posited that this analysis “may
differ for other agencies that employ administrative law judges.”379
He specifically mentioned the statute governing the Social Security
Administration and inferred that the abundance of dissimilar
statutory regimes which govern the plethora of federal agencies
other than the SEC might well lead to disparate outcomes on
the same question.380
“The upshot, in my view,” emoted Justice Breyer, is that the
Court should resolve nothing today beyond finding that the Commission’s ALJs were not lawfully appointed.381 But the learned
Justice urged that this outcome should be reached on statutory
grounds alone.382 Proceeding to the constitutional question would,
by necessity, implicate the Court’s decision in Free Enterprise
Fund.383 To invoke that stalwart precedent in the case at bar
might provoke “dramatic” results, he warned.384
Id. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1999).
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2058 (Breyer, J., concurring).
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id.
380 Id. This portion of the concurrence is consistent with Justice Breyer’s
concern for the continuance in office of the ALJs serving the Social Security
Administration, as he voiced nearly a decade ago in Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB,
561 U.S. 477 (2010). Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2059.
381 Id. at 2058–59.
382 Id. at 2057.
383 Id. at 2059.
384 Id.
374
375
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Couching his trepidation in a sequence of hypotheticals,
Justice Breyer cautioned that making a full-fledged application
of Free Enterprise Fund to the validity of the appointments in
question here might then require applying the same rubric of
constitutional analysis to the concomitant statutory removal
procedures safeguarding ALJs.385 “This would risk transforming
administrative law judges from independent adjudicators into
dependent decision makers,” beholden to the Commission which
installed them in office.386 Justice Breyer did not sugarcoat his
reasons for hesitating to act precipitously here. He envisioned any
continuation of the constitutional inquiry as a threat to the meritbased civil service system that has held sway for over a century.387
Viewed from a certain perspective, it would seem Justice
Breyer’s key concern was that indulging in an Article II examination would inevitably lead to the dismantling of the “for
cause” removal restrictions protecting the continuance of ALJs
in office.388 Given that danger, he advocated for the Court binding itself to a statutory analysis only, thereby avoiding the invocation of Free Enterprise Fund, and its unavoidable imposition of
the strictures mandated by the Appointments Clause.389
Justice Breyer then elucidated why he believed that making
a ruling upon constitutional grounds in the instant case could be
upsetting to legislative intent.390 Properly understood, the Appointments Clause grants Congress “a degree of leeway as to
whether particular Government workers are officers or instead
mere employees.”391
Justice Breyer grounded his belief upon the text of Article
II, which plainly states that “Congress may by Law” vest the
appointment of inferior officers in department heads and others.392 This suggested to Justice Breyer that “Congress, not the
Judicial Branch alone, must play a major role” in determining
Id. at 2060.
Id.
387 Id.
388 Id. at 2061–62.
389 Id. at 2058–59.
390 Id. at 2062–63.
391 Id. at 2062.
392 Id. at 2060 (emphasis in the original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
385
386
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an individual’s classification as an officer of the United States.393
Accordingly, in these matters legislative intent “is often highly
relevant.”394
Continuing in this vein of circumspection, Justice Breyer
argued against the imposition of bright-line rules.395 In light of
the diversity of civil service positions, an examination of their
statutory underpinnings, “while highly relevant, need not always
prove determinative.”396 The Justice cited these realities as further
support for his contention that Congressional intent and formulations have value in classifying persons as officers or employees
within the vast federal bureaucracy.397
Progressing towards his conclusion, Justice Breyer turned
to the distinct matter of the remedy ordered by the majority in
the case at bar. And just as separately, he disagreed with the edict
that a fresh magistrate had to preside over the remand of Mr.
Lucia’s proceedings.398 Making short shrift of this final issue,
Justice Breyer deemed it sufficient that the SEC had, as the head
of department, bestowed a commission of office (albeit subsequently) upon the original adjudicator.399 The instant situation
is no different from the customary remand by a tribunal to the
initial hearing officer, and Justice Breyer found the matter at
hand to be indistinguishable from the nominal case.400
Justice Breyer concluded the duality of his concurrence
and dissent with a stern warning. The Court’s methodology this
day in resolving Lucia was “problematic” at best.401 The bifurcation
of the appointments controversy from the removal provisions
Id.
Id. at 2062–63. Justice Breyer was careful to note that Congress does not
have a free hand in these matters. The lawmakers may not arbitrarily recategorize true officers of the United States as ordinary employees. No doubt the Justice was fearful of legislative fiat reshaping the government at the whim of
Congress. Id. at 2063.
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id. at 2064.
399 Id.
400 Id. Among other things, Justice Breyer noted the change in adjudicators was never addressed below, and, more to his point, Justice Breyer could
not explain “why the Constitution would require” a new ALJ. Id.
401 Id.
393
394
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question threatened to unravel the entire federal construct of
administrative adjudication one agency at a time.402
Lucia ends there, and now assumes its rightful place in the
pantheon of constitutional jurisprudence. And while we have described in detail the wisdom of the high Court in resolving this important Article II controversy, we have one vital mission remaining.
VII.ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
We come now to the important task of analyzing Lucia. From
the outset, it must be made clear that we eschew the traditional
mode of review, that is, merely dissecting this new landmark in
isolation, with nothing more. That methodology is woefully insufficient in the instant case.
To be certain, there is a good deal more to be said with regard
to this latest proclamation of the Supreme Court. Lucia is a
landmark first notable for how it arrived at the high Court, for
reason that its route to the Justices varied from the customary
path.403 Nor is it even enough to make a more fulsome examination of this precedent’s lineage.
What Lucia bodes for the future, the questions left unanswered, and the significant controversies that may yet ensue, is
equally worthy of our contemplation, possibly more so. We now
address these points seriatim.
402 Id. Justice Sotomayor, as joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissent,
wherein she contended that “Commission ALJs are not officers because they
lack final decision making authority.” Id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
By virtue of this conclusion, she posited “it is not necessary to reach the constitutionality of their removal protections.” Id. at 2067. Lastly, the dissent joined
Justice Breyer’s contention that the same ALJ who heard Lucia’s enforcement
proceeding in the first instance could preside on the remand. Interesting on
two fronts, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent did not find Freytag as essential to
finding a resolution here as did the majority. Id. Second, the dissent found
Free Enterprise Fund distinguishable from the case at bar. Id. For reasons we
shall soon elaborate upon in the subsequent discussion, we cannot help but
think that the learned dissent garnered the wrong conclusion from certain
facts, most especially the relative power of the Commission’s ALJs. Justice
Sotomayor made much of the power of the full body to review, and even reject,
the holdings of its adjudicators. Yet the dissent gave short shrift to the SEC’s
inherent power to adopt the findings of its delegates as the agency’s own, let
alone the possibility, if not the fact, that many proceedings are never carried
beyond the ALJ level, thereby making the determinations of these administrative law judges final and binding.
403 Id. at 2049–51.
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A.Lucia and Its Appointments Clause Teachings
It is only fitting that the first portion of our analysis be devoted to the wisdom Lucia imparts with respect to the Appointments Clause, and our understanding thereof. Again, this is what
makes this new landmark one of the constitutional variety and
not merely a resolution of securities law issues.
Hereinabove, we have exposited the precise language of
Lucia; therefore, we have no need at this point to regurgitate
same. Rather, our analysis shall be of the essentials of this newest
landmark, for reason that part of Lucia’s elegance is its simplicity.
First, consider the initial layer of the Court’s decision. It
brings together a pair Article II precedents separated in time by
nearly a century yet bound by their clear expressions of the meaning of the Appointments Clause.404
Anchoring one corner of this foundation is Germaine, the
post–Civil War case that distinguished officers of the United
States from mere employees, based, in part, upon the permanency of their endeavors.405
Standing opposite is the companionable case of Buckley v.
Valeo, and its wisdom that it is the exertion of significant authority
by an office-holder which largely determines if that person should
be classified as an officer of the United States.406 Yet these counterparts, important as they might be, provided only the first
level of the necessary Appointments Clause critique.407
Far more crucial is the role the high Court assigned to
Freytag in resolving the current controversy regarding the appointment of the SEC’s ALJs. The first and most telling point is
the kinship between the adjudicators challenged in Lucia and
the special trial judges under scrutiny in Freytag. Without putting too fine a point on it, both sets of jurists toiled internally at
Id. at 2051.
Id.
406 Id.
407 As indicated hereinabove, we concur with the Court’s choice not to embellish upon the teachings of Buckley. We agree it would simply have been unwise
to do so, for any expansion of Buckley would have been superfluous to deciding
Lucia. Rather, the Justices shall await a justifiable need to clarify Buckley,
assuming it ever arises, and the proper context in which to expound upon
that vaunted landmark.
404
405
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important government agencies, deliberated upon complex factual matters and even more complicated disputes of law, and
then issued decisions with significant repercussions for private
citizens embroiled in litigation with the sovereign.408
Most compelling, it was the means by which these in-house
judges adjudicated the matters put before them by their respective
agencies. Both the SEC’s administrative law judges and the Tax
Court’s STJs heard testimony, weighted credibility, and held
considerable sway over the course of these contested proceedings.409
An exercise of “significant authority,” indeed, as defined by the
Supreme Court consistently throughout Germaine, Buckley, and
Freytag.410 In a very real sense, Lucia did not break new ground
with respect to officer status being derived from the exercise of
significant authority. Rather, it can fairly be said that Lucia was
the logical and sensible outcome of its antecedents.
Lastly, by placing the probability of the finality of the decisions rendered by the SEC’s in-house judges in contradistinction
with the potential for conclusiveness enjoyed by the specialist tax
adjudicators, the Lucia case wisely and pragmatically recognized
the true extent of the “significant authority” routinely exercised by
jurists who have much in common in the discharge of their duties.411 Little wonder the Supreme Court declared the SEC ALJs
of Lucia are almost complete duplicates of the STJs, and therefore
subject to the exact same Appointments Clause precepts enunciated in Freytag.412
It is beyond peradventure that Freytag comprehensively
listed the elements which classify an office-holder as an officer of
the United States subject to the requirements of the Appointments
Clause.413 Lucia shares that same worthwhile characteristic.
In this newest Article II landmark, Justice Kagan parsed
these attributes into two distinct categories: the nature of the
office and the powers exercised by the appointee.414
Id. at 2053.
Id.
410 Id. at 2051–53.
411 Id. at 2052.
412 Id. at 2053.
413 Id.
414 Id. at 2052–53.
408
409
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As to the first, Lucia bestows officer of the United States
status where the position in question is established by statute,
continuously operates (and, conversely, is therefore not intermittent), pays a salary, and imposes duties set out in the law.415 One
might categorize these as the structural components establishing an appointee as an officer of the United States subject to the
Appointments Clause.
The second body of elements which lead to classification
as an officer of the United States bound to the rigors of Article II
are the actual tasks to be performed by the office-holder. 416 The
greater the discretion exercised by the appointee, the more significant the functions she performs, then the more certain the
individual is an officer of the United States.417
Quite telling is how the Lucia majority compared the means
by which the SEC’s ALJs conduct proceedings with the customary duties of full-fledged Article III jurists.418 There is an undeniable symmetry here.
Federal judges attain their lofty posts by an appointive
process clearly set out in Article II.419 Lucia has now decreed
that agency adjudicators must undergo the same rigors of the
Appointments Clause because they exercise a portion of the sovereign power of the United States, again something that only
true officers of the United States are capable of doing.420 While
leagues away from parity with the Article III judiciary, this
shared characteristic compels the imposition of the same constitutional process for appointment.421
This was a bold step by the Lucia Court, to so unequivocally catalogue these trappings of judicial authority routinely
exercised by the Commission’s administrative law judges. To be
sure, Justice Kagan’s point-by-point comparison was between
Id.
Id. at 2053.
417 Id. at 2052–54.
418 Id. at 2053.
419 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
420 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
421 Recall the earlier observation herein that Congress provided the catalyst for such comparisons when it renamed these adjudicators administrative
law judges, and explicitly declared that the ALJs shared the characteristics of
Article III jurists. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
415
416
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the Tax Court’s STJs and the SEC’s in-house jurists.422 Yet implicit
therein was the unmistakable similarity between the nominal
powers of the latter agency’s adjudicator with the true exercise
of the judicial power of the United States by those holding the
office of Article III judge.423
In this respect, the eventual outcome of Lucia was obvious. Once the high Court decided to employ the same methodology found in Freytag, the Lucia Court was compelled to reach
the same outcome. Anything else would have usurped the wisdom
of the former case.
Put another way, if the Freytag Court deemed the specialist tax jurists to be officers of the United States because of the
judicial power they wielded, then regard for precedent—not to
mention plain sense—required Lucia to make the same declaration for the Commission’s ALJs, who functioned in a nearly
identical manner.424
Also worthy of our respect is Lucia’s close scrutiny of the
finality of decisions reached by the SEC ALJs, particularly when
compared to the powers of the STJs in Freytag, and as a component of determining status as officers of the United States. The
Lucia Court took pains to note that the adjunct tax jurists were
subject to far more oversight of their rulings than the Commission’s administrative law judges.425
Moreover, greater opportunities existed for the ruling of
an SEC ALJ to avoid further review and become, without alteration, final agency action.426 Justice Kagan’s pithy comment that
the Commission’s in-house adjudicators enjoy far more autonomy and independence in rendering their decisions justifies Lucia’s
holding that these ALJs are truly officers of the United States.427
Therefore, such persons must attain office in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause.428
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052–54.
See id.
424 See id.
425 Id. at 2047, 2053–54.
426 Id. at 2053–54.
427 Id. at 2054 (“That last-word capacity makes this an a fortiori case: If the
Tax Court’s STJs are officers, as Freytag held, then the Commission’s ALJs must
be too.”).
428 Id. at 2055.
422
423
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Another astute conclusion reached in Lucia is its refusal
to equate the absence of a formal power of contempt with a lack
of authority.429 The high Court deftly notes that a jurist does not
require the contempt power in order to exercise significant authority.430
The SEC’s ALJs were clearly at liberty to shape the proceeding before them by, inter alia, regulating discovery, testimony,
and the admission of evidence.431 The Supreme Court fairly noted
that an adjudicator armed with such a panoply of powers could
easily control a case, even without a formalistic power to punish
contempt.432 The mere availability of such options to the Commission’s in-house adjudicators was, by itself, an exercise of the
significant authority imperative to declaring these ALJs to be
officers of the United States, and therefore subject to the prerequisites of the Appointments Clause.433
And the culmination of the judicial powers vested in the
agency’s ALJs might be the most decisive of all: the ultimate
power to rule. Lucia recognized that, in a very real sense, the
power of an administrative law judge to issue a decision is all the
exercise of significant authority she needs in order to be classified as an officer of the United States, and one that must withstand
the rigors of the Appointments Clause vis-à-vis her attainment
of office.434
Lastly, there is the admittedly ancillary, yet no less necessary, component of Lucia’s ultimate adjudication: the degree of
finality typically bestowed upon the deliberations of the SEC’s
ALJs. Justice Kagan concisely marshaled the salient points: the
Commission generally accords deference to the findings of its inhouse adjudicators; it is the exception, not the rule, for the SEC
to reverse the final determinations of the agency’s jurists.435 In
those few words, Lucia recognized the truth of the matter; for
the most part, the rulings of the Commission’s administrative
law judges wore the imprimatur of conclusive agency actions.436
Id. at 2054.
Id.
431 Id. at 2049.
432 Id. at 2054.
433 Id. at 2055.
434 Id. at 2053–55.
435 Id. at 2054–55.
436 Id.
429
430
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This small, but nonetheless important, determination underscored the broader holding that SEC ALJs are officers of the
United States, for reason that they irrefutably exercise significant authority, and operate with a fair degree of discretion in
doing so. Since the high Court had decided years ago in Freytag
that individuals possessed of that prerogative must attain office
pursuant to the strictures of the Appointments Clause,437 the
Lucia Court of the present was simply being consistent with
established precedent in reaching the same outcome.438
Now to summarize Lucia for its own sake. This newest
Article II landmark decision is built upon the firmest of foundations, specifically Freytag and its kin. In a real sense, Freytag
supplied the rule of decision here, and rightly so.
First, there are the factual similarities which are so striking
here. True, the Tax Court’s STJs in the Court’s earlier pronouncement were adjuncts to a duly constituted court.439 Nonetheless,
the Tax Court, and its subsidiary tax adjudicators, are more
accurately described as administrators of that other bureaucratic
behemoth, the Internal Revenue Code. Exalting, as we must,
substance over mere labels, Freytag’s STJs are best classified as
the administrative law judges of federal tax law. Since it is beyond peradventure that the SEC administers a sister monolith
of national law, to wit, the federal securities acts, the Commission’s in-house jurists have a great deal in common with the Tax
Court’s subalterns. Thus, the grounds for Lucia were no different from the basis for Freytag, and therefore the outcome of the
former flowed from the rule established in the latter.
Second, let us address the legal principles espoused here.
The Lucia Court upheld the precepts of law established in Freytag,
paramount among them that an officer of the United States is
recognized by her exercise of significant authority.440 In Freytag,
Special Tax Judges did so by enjoying a fair degree of authority
in presiding over significant tax controversies, having the power
to shape proceedings, and were subject to review (and even reversed) in certain circumstances.441 Such was the rule of law
announced in Freytag: the establishment of a multifaceted test for
Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991).
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
439 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870–71.
440 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051–52.
441 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 873–74, 881–82.
437
438
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what is significant authority, the fact that who exercises the same
is an officer of the United States, and, most of all, that such an
office-holder must be appointed by a method comporting with
Article II.442
At the end of the day, Lucia made a straightforward application of Freytag to the case at bar. The Court of today concluded the Commission’s ALJs exercised as much significant
authority as their tax law counterparts, possibly even more because
the deference and general lack of review of the former’s determinations emphasized the significance of the authority they exercised, and the discretion granted them.443
Again, precedent ruled the day, as well it should. With the
cognizable difference between the Tax Court’s STJs and the
SEC’s ALJs ranging from slim to none, Lucia saw no need to depart
from the cogent analysis of Freytag.444 Deference to the rule of
law would not allow such a detour, nor did the situation merit
such a diversion from the high Court’s established precepts.
As a brief aside, we make the following notes for the future of Freytag, Lucia, and their progeny. One, we agree with
Justice Kagan’s common sense in setting aside the government’s
request to clarify Freytag, in fairness a call, for whatever reason,
seeking a whole revisitation of that proclamation.445 Lucia rightly
found such a venture wholly unnecessary to the matter at hand.
Moreover, the instant case was most likely not the proper vehicle
for an overhaul of Freytag’s well-known axioms. Nevertheless,
we candidly admit that day might come, and soon. As a nation, we
must always be foremost concerned with portentous constitutional
matters, such as checking the exercise of government power,
especially by unelected office-holders. For that reason, the reexamination of Freytag postponed by Lucia may yet come before the
Court, and sooner, as opposed to later.
Next, we respect Justice Thomas’ erudite concurrence in
Lucia, where he makes the discriminating point, inter alia, that
Freytag (and, by extension now, Lucia) does not resolve every
Appointments Clause challenge.446 We applaud the veteran Justice
Id. at 881–82.
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54.
444 Id. at 2053–55.
445 Id. at 2051.
446 Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
442
443
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for his dual adherence and mild amplification of Freytag to the
matter then at hand. And we tend to agree with his prediction
for the future of the appointive proviso of Article II before the
high bench. We concur; it is most likely that future constitutional
controversies predicated upon the Appointments Clause will
require the amplification, clarification, or extension (possibly all
three) of the maxims now embodied in the conjoined holdings of
Freytag and Lucia. In this context, we rely upon these sage pronouncements of Justice Thomas: “We have been willing to check
the improper allocation of executive power” on occasion.447 Even
more predictive is Justice Thomas’s wry comment that the Supreme Court has answered the call “probably not as often as we
should.”448 We assert that Justice Thomas has the right of it.
Yes, the Supreme Court has acted to check unbridled executive
power; Lucia is proof of the high Court’s watchfulness.
Yet it is debatable if the high bench needs to do more, in
the proper context of course. The next Appointments Clause
controversy might not only prove to be the catalyst for a further
examination of the axioms found in Freytag, and now Lucia. More
importantly, it may yield yet another opportunity to apply Article
II and reinforce, as a check upon executive power, the invaluable
accountability that safeguards our precious liberty.
Lucia is now concluded. By its teachings, we know that
the SEC’s administrative law judges previously attained office
unconstitutionally, for reason that the mode of their appointment did not satisfy the rigors of Article II.449
Nevertheless, the Commission’s global order, issued while
Lucia was sub judice, appears to have written the penultimate
chapter here. With the agency’s ruling council, as the “head of a
department,” having bestowed its benediction of approval upon
the present office-holders, it would seem that the ultimate command of Lucia has now been complied with. This should conclude the matter of the constitutionality of SEC ALJs attaining
office, at least for the present time.
But now, as a newly minted Appointments Clause precedent, Lucia may yet prove to be the pivot upon which the next
447 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S.
477 (2010)).
448 Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
449 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
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constitutional challenge shall turn. In truth, Lucia presages, some
might even say preordains, the next challenge to be brought
pursuant to Article II.
B.Avoiding the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance
Our second point of analysis is not what Lucia decided.
Rather, we respectfully ask: was it necessary for the Supreme
Court to even decide Lucia in the first place?
Yes, Lucia is the law of the land, and worthy of its place in
the pantheon of constitutional jurisprudence, particularly with
respect to the proper interpretation of the Appointments Clause.
But it is far too easy to merely deal with Lucia as a fait accompli.
Notwithstanding the high Court’s willingness in embracing
the constitutional question, there are countervailing principles
of constitutional interpretation that militate against the Supreme Court’s willingness to enter the fray.
The Lucia Court demonstrated fortitude in resolving the
constitutional question posed to it. But one must still ask, was
that strictly necessary? Consider the high Court’s cardinal rules
with regard to the proper approach to be taken to claims of constitutional infirmities.
It is axiomatic that the courts should avoid resolving constitutional questions whenever possible: “If there is one doctrine
more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional
adjudication, it is that [the Court] ought not to pass on questions
of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”450 This “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” enjoys the
sanction of “time and experience.”451 It serves an essential need
to protect both “the law and the adjudicatory process.”452 In sum,
the courts do not decide constitutional questions “needlessly.”453
That “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” was respected
in full by a significant number of the appellate courts cited herein
above. Prior to the D.C. Circuit issuing the decision that was to
come before the high Court, and certainly well before the Justices
even deigned to grant review of Lucia, the Seventh, Second,
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quotation and citation omitted).
451 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quotation and citation omitted).
452 Id. at 16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
453 Id.
450
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Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits had successfully resolved the essential controversy on grounds other than the Appointments Clause.454
The relevant tribunals avoided a potential constitutional quagmire, not by adroitness, but via adherence to the principle of
restraint articulated in Zobrest and elsewhere.455
In truth, the number of tribunals which fell into this category did not aggregate into a strict numerical majority of all the
circuits.456 Yet they constituted a growing consensus, that, had
it been given time, might have eventually coalesced into a true
and undeniable majority of circuit court reasoning.
But as to that reasoning, we make an even more telling
point. Those four august Courts of Appeals made declarations
eminently rational, and eminently reasonable, in light of the constitutional precept noted above. Each of these panels was faithful
to the overarching imperative of avoiding a constitutional question
wherever possible.
Interestingly, the tribunals concluding it was better to
avoid the Article II question comprised less than half of the federal circuits by number.457 That tally is intriguing, when one
considers that the relevant Exchange Act bestows upon any person aggrieved by SEC action the prerogative to seek review before the appellate court of their choice.458
Put another way, it could once be said there was ample
opportunity for the remainder of the circuit benches to add their
own wisdom to the then nascent conflict, a contentiousness that
might be fairly deemed at the time as falling short of a genuine
internecine controversy. Yet the Court’s instant decision in Lucia
arrested the development of further arguments which might have
brought the matter at hand to a higher state of evolution.
Certainly, it is beyond peradventure that Lucia and
Bandimere were diametrically opposed. As point in fact, the Tenth
See generally Bennett v. SEC, 844 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC,
825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015);
Tilton v. SEC (Tilton II), 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016).
455 See generally Bennett, 844 F.3d; Hill, 825 F.3d; Bebo, 799 F.3d; Tilton II,
824 F.3d.
456 See generally Bennett, 844 F.3d; Hill, 825 F.3d; Bebo, 799 F.3d; Tilton II,
824 F.3d. Four out of the thirteen circuits have followed this approach.
457 See generally Bennett, 844 F.3d; Hill, 825 F.3d; Bebo, 799 F.3d; Tilton II,
824 F.3d.
458 15 U.S.C. § 78y (2012).
454
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Circuit embraced the irreconcilable conflict.459 But is Supreme
Court review justified when discord, even pertaining to a subject as
meaningful as the Appointments Clause, is cabined to only two
tribunals out of the more than dozen federal appellate courts?
Let it be repeated that Lucia is a most worthy and notable
addition to the Court’s Article II jurisprudence. Yet we are troubled, first by the fact that it might be a proclamation made before
its time, and even more so, that this new landmark came at a
cost to even more august principles governing when constitutional arguments should be addressed.
Now, take the foregoing axioms favoring the avoidance of
constitutional questions unless they are unavoidable, and contrast
them, not only to the situation in Lucia, but how this newest
Supreme Court landmark may be the harbinger of more Appointments Clause controversies.
C.Lucia as the Template for Challenging ALJs
An undeniable aspect of modern America is its behemoth
administrative state. As so well put by Chief Justice Roberts,
Americans have been forced to tolerate bureaucrats “poking into
every nook and cranny of daily life.”460 For decades now, regulatory agencies and those that toil therein constitute “a veritable
fourth branch of the Government,” essentially rearranging our
notions of a tripartite system of governance.461 This extraconstitutional body wields great power, in large part by means of what
commentators have labeled a “hidden judiciary.”462
It is beyond refute that the drafters of the Founding Documents could not have foreseen contemporary SEC ALJs,463 nor,
in all likelihood, the latter’s numerous peers presently at work within the far-flung bureaucracy extant today. It is equally unlikely
Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (expressly disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit’s holding
in Lucia); see also Lucia Petition for Certiorari, supra note 250, at 19 (“The
question presented is binary; one of these two decisions must be wrong.”).
460 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
461 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
462 See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1643, 1645 (2016) (quotations omitted).
463 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1170.
459
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the Framers envisioned these administrative adjudicators would
outnumber the constitutionally authorized Article III bench by a
ratio of two to one.464
Such matters are well illustrated by Lucia and its antecedents. Therefore, we can only rightfully contemplate this newest
Supreme Court pronouncement in light of its impact upon the
opaque administrative branch and its in-house adjudicators.
As revealed in the instant controversy, there are reportedly
a total of 1,792 administrative law judges in service to federal
agencies today.465 The number of Social Security Administration
adjudicators provide but one pungent example of the pervasive
influence of appointed ALJs over the daily lives of many Americans.
1,537 Social Security Administration ALJs alone “collectively handle hundreds of thousands of hearings a year.”466
Such facts were well known to the Court over a decade before
Lucia appeared on the docket.467
This lends credence to the statement that “[t]oo many important decisions of the Federal Government are made nowadays
by unelected agency officials.”468 It is common knowledge that
these agencies and their in-house adjudicators act upon matters
of grave importance to ordinary citizens.469
Equally so, administrative agencies today are rightly said
to exert significant power over the economic and social life of the
Nation.470
Agencies and their nonjudicial arbiters therefore represent
one side of a conflict between “executive power and individual
liberty.”471 If administrative law judges are left unrestrained,
See AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS—FROM 1789 TO PRESENT, https://www.us
courts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships [https://perma.cc/2X5X-HSFC]
(860 authorized judgeships for 2016).
465 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 n.5.
466 Id. at 1199 nn.5–6 (McKay, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
467 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 542–43 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting in excess of 1,500 ALJs in the employ of the federal government at the time).
468 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1610 (2014)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
469 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting).
470 PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I), 839 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated
and remanded en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
471 Id. at 5.
464
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they can pose a “significant threat” to bedrock principles of separation of powers and checks and balances.472
Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of the modern federal
bureaucracy, Lucia has made it clear that present-day administrative law judges are susceptible to an Appointments Clause
challenge. By extending the precepts of Freytag, reflecting the
theoretical basis of Free Enterprise Fund, and even reaching back
nearly a century and a half to invoke the teachings of Germaine, the
Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement has illuminated a path
towards challenging all in-house adjudicators on the claim that
they were not appointed consonant with the mandates of Article II.
Could Lucia eventually lead to chaos? Certainly, one
hopes not. Yet Justice Sotomayor alluded to such a possibility in
her dissent.473
To be quite clear, we proclaim that Lucia was inestimably
correct in its core holding; one upholding the guarantee of liberty
safeguarded by the Appointments Clause. We applaud Lucia for
its forthrightness in preserving accountability to the People,
precisely as the Framers envisioned in the context of Article II
and executive appointments.
Yet we have genuine concerns for the systemic risk it
might engender. It is virtually assured that Lucia shall unleash
an untold number of fresh challenges against ALJs across a
broad spectrum of agencies, and endanger the everyday administrative adjudications alluded to above. It is not beyond the
realm of possibility that “all federal ALJs are at risk” in the constitutional wake of Lucia.474 We pause at the thought of the further possibility that this new landmark, no matter how necessary
and correct it might be, “effectively render[s] invalid thousands
of administrative actions.”475
As stipulated at the outset of this Article, it would be folly to
view Lucia in isolation. This new Supreme Court landmark could
well be the harbinger of many cases yet to come, each one challenging the authority of administrative law judges at work at a myriad
of federal agencies. Indeed, we have little doubt that Lucia shall
be a wellspring of litigation concerning this constitutional issue.
Id. at 6.
See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2064 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
474 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting).
475 Id.
472
473
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To be sure, this assessment is not wholly our own. A decade
ago, the high Court itself identified this very possibility. Writing
in Free Enterprise Fund, Justice Breyer voiced concern over the
fate of the [then] fifteen hundred plus ALJs then holding office.476 The in-house adjudicators employed by the SEC are but a
minuscule fraction of that adjudicative work force.477 Parties
aggrieved at being called to task before these jurists are compelled, if not mandated, to raise an Appointments Clause challenge similar to that undergirding Lucia.478
Certainly, we have not undertaken an exhaustive study of
the statutes and procedures governing the appointment of ALJs by
federal agencies other than the overseer of the securities markets;
to do so would unnecessarily detract from the focus of this Article.
Yet the point is irrefutable. It is more likely than not that
such adjudicators, for reason of their sheer numbers alone, attain
office via a methodology far more like an internal, bureaucratic
process, and quite different and removed from the methodology
demanded by Article II.
Even further beyond peradventure is the undeniable fact
that the Commission’s ALJs and their peers at sister agencies
have a commonality of adjudicative power. At the risk of oversimplification, most, if not all, of these administrative judges
operate in an identical manner: they preside over contested matters; hear testimony, review evidence, and decide the probity and
weight of same; and eventually these ALJs issue rulings which
carry the force of their parent agency.479
With respect to the latter, as a matter of practicality, such
determinations might be final indeed, as the mere availability of
an appeal (either higher in the subject agency or by an Article
III court) by no means guarantees that the option of subsequent
review will actually be exercised.480
Free Enter. Fund v. PCOAB, 561 U.S. 477, 542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049 (noting that the SEC currently has only
five ALJs).
478 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 543–44.
479 See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049.
480 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II), 881 F.3d 75, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Henderson, K., dissenting). In her erudite dissent, Judge Karen LeCraft
Henderson cautioned the mere fact that there exists a statutory right of appeal to
a circuit court (the typical avenue offered to those disadvantaged by an ALJ’s
decision) does not absolve any constitutional infirmities in the appointive process
for particular administrative law judges.
476
477
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The salient point of Lucia is that it identified the key attributes which determine if an adjudicator holds the rank of officer
of the United States.481 This latest promulgation of the high Court
confirmed the parameters previously set forth in Freytag, and
then refined them, for the purpose of establishing a fairly comprehensive test for the application of Article II to questions of
executive appointments.482
Lucia is a powerful edict, for it first catalogues these adjudicative prerogatives, and then finds that SEC administrative law
judges fall squarely within its ambit.483 From there, it is a
small—and unavoidable—step to classifying these in-house adjudicators as officers of the United States who can attain their
office solely by means of compliance with the strictures of the
Appointments Clause.
Lucia has the truth of it, then: agency adjudicators exercising significant authority are officers of the United States.484
Therefore, they are susceptible to a constitutional challenge unless they attained office in a manner compliant with the
Appointments Clause.485 Without such conformity, they fail to
meet the demands of Article II. In postulating these axioms, the
Supreme Court’s newest Appointments Clause landmark not
only establishes the template for future litigation, it invites it.
D.Lucia’s Unanswered Question and the Next Constitutional
Crisis for the Appointments Clause
Many have predicted that the next constitutional crisis shall
arise from the question deliberately left unanswered by the high
Court in Lucia: do statutory restrictions upon the President’s power
to remove administrative law judges violate the Appointments
Clause?486 Recall the respondent SEC urged the Justices to resolve this query, but the high bench declined.487
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54.
Id. at 2053.
483 Id. at 2053–54.
484 See id. at 2053–55.
485 See id. at 2055.
486 Id. at 2059–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Steven D. Schwinn, Lucia v.
SEC and the Attack on the Administrative State, AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 256 (2017–18).
487 See Brief for Respondent at 21, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018)
(No. 17-130).
481
482
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Certainly, we acknowledged the existence of the question
of an earlier point in this Article but did so in a deliberately understated manner. Our rationale was since the Supreme Court
did not formally embrace the issue, it would be unwise for us to
elevate it from subtext.
After all, it must be recalled that the government was
most insistent that the Justices openly adopt this additional
query and resolve it as an essential part of Lucia.488 Yet since
the high Court effectively ignored the sovereign’s plea, we were
not at liberty to differ.489
Until now. To be quite sure, we concur that Lucia was not
the appropriate vehicle to decide if Article II is violated when
the President’s power to remove an administrative law judge is
constrained by statute. All the government’s protestations to the
contrary, the Court was indisputably correct to avoid that constitutional question on the day it accorded Mr. Lucia victory.
But there is another reason, one far more just and powerful.
The Lucia Court was right not to decide the removal
question because, in all likelihood, it shall soon find its own way
to the high bench. However, the vehicle for that next constitutional adjudication has yet to be determined. At least one prime
contender did not answer the bell, but other possibilities now
loom in the lower courts.
With respect to the former, a most worthy candidate would
have been PHH II, a D.C. Circuit decision we alluded to previously
herein.490 That bifurcated controversy touched upon many of the
Article II points raised in Lucia, most especially the constitutionality under an Appointments Clause analysis of a statutory
bar to the President removing an agency official from office.491
So as not to detract from this Article’s proper focus upon
Lucia, we summarize PHH II ever so briefly. At an earlier stage,
a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit declared that the Director
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the CFPB) held
office unconstitutionally because he could not be removed by the
Id.
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2060–61 (Breyer, S., dissenting).
490 See supra notes 51–68 and accompanying text.
491 PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II), 881 F.3d 75, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2018); id. at
156–57 (Henderson, J., dissenting); id. at 166 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
488
489
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President.492 In a forceful opinion rendered by then–Circuit Judge
Kavanaugh, the tribunal found the statutory provisos insulating
the CFPB’s Director from removal by the Chief Executive were
an irremediable violation of the Appointments Clause.493
Subsequently, a sharply divided D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed the panel, and declared that the sanctity of the Appointments Clause was unmolested by the ability of the agency’s chief
to retain office without fear of removal by the Chief Executive.494
PHH II, most especially its dissent, deals with many of
the same issues addressed in Lucia, among them, the Appointments Clause, the accountability of Executive Branch functionaries to the President and, therefore, the People, and the liberty
interest preserved by that same accountability.495 Indeed, as so
ably argued in the erudite dissents found in PHH II, the President’s inability to remove an administrative agency official is
doubly sinful.
Its first transgression is that it renders the office-holder
unaccountable to the People.496 Its second affront, equally offensive
to the Constitution, is that it exonerates the President from accounting to the People for the actions of a member of officialdom.497
In hindsight, one might speculate that the Lucia Court
deliberately left the removal question for another day because
there was some supposition that PHH II would eventually find
its way to the high Court’s docket. Yet such musings are futile.
As fate would have it, neither side petitioned for Supreme Court
review of the D.C. Circuit’s fractious opinion.498
As made clear in our references to PHH II, and its predecessor PHH I, at various points within this Article, that proceeding was driven by the maxim of liberty requires accountability,
but with its Appointments Clause connotations viewed via the
PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH I), 839 F.3d 1, 31, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated
and remanded en banc, PHH II, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
493 Indeed, then–Circuit Judge Kavanaugh described this offense against
Article II in the most egregious of terms. Id. at 7–9.
494 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 137.
495 Id. at 164, 183 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
496 Id. at 164–66.
497 Id. at 164, 166, 168.
498 See, e.g., Barbara S. Mishkin, No U.S. Supreme Court review sought in
PHH, BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (May 4, 2018),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/05/04/no-u-s-supreme-court-re
view-sought-in-phh/ [https://perma.cc/Y8LD-39M2].
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prism of the correlative power to remove, as opposed to appoint.
Nonetheless, given the congruency of the two under any Article
II scrutiny, it is a given that Lucia would have powerfully influenced, if not outright provided the rule of decision, had PHH II
been granted high Court review.499
Yet there is no need for disappointment; rather, anticipation, albeit measured, is in order. For while PHH II never proved
to be the vehicle for the Supreme Court to resolve Lucia’s unanswered question, other controversies are looming on the horizon,
and may yet arrive before the Justices in due course.
Indeed, it would seem the same administrative agency at
the eye of the storm in PHH II abounds with such possibilities
for further testing of the demands of the Appointments Clause.
One such instance involving the embattled Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau is C.F.P.B. v. RD Legal Funding, LLC.500 There,
Senior District Judge Loretta J. Preska, former Chief Judge of
New York’s illustrious Southern District, dismissed an agency
enforcement action “because [the CFPB’s] composition violates
the Constitution’s separation of powers.”501 The learned district
judge openly rejected the majority holding of PHH II, choosing to
explicitly adopt then–Circuit Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in that
fractious D.C. Circuit holding.502
Embedded in Judge Preska’s pithy constitutional analysis
was the Article II violation inherent in the CFPB’s infrastructure,
to wit, the inability to remove the agency’s head at the will of
the Chief Executive.503 While the gravamen of the RD Funding
499 See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, No. 18-5062, 2018 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16266, at *1, *4 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 916 (2019).
According to the petitioner, the unpublished decision of the D.C. tribunal was
“wholly based” upon PHH II. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Mnuchin, 139 S.
Ct. 916 (2019) (No. 18-307); see also Marcia Coyle, Justices, With Kavanaugh Sidelined, Rebuff Challenge to Consumer Bureau, ALM MEDIA (Jan. 16, 2019) (LEXIS)
(detailing, inter alia, the substance of the constitutional challenge to the authority
of the CFPB’s solitary director, and Justice Kavanaugh’s recusal from the controversy, for reason of the depth of his participation in PHH I and II). As point
in fact, we concur with the reported view of the Solicitor General that the Supreme
Court should await a vehicle wherein the entire high bench may participate
without restraint. Id.
500 CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 745–46
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
501 Id. at 785 (quotations and citations omitted).
502 Id. at 784.
503 Id. at 784–85.
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decision rests upon separation of powers, the interrelationship of
those maxims to the operation of and justification behind the
Appointments Clause cannot be minimized. Judge Preska’s clear
adoption of the notions espoused in PHH II’s dissent verifies the
kinship and shared rationales of both opinions.504
Presuming RD Funding remains controversial, the Supreme
Court may eventually find this case to be the proper vehicle to
respond to the removal question so ardently posited by the SEC
in Lucia, and thereby extend Appointments Clause analysis set
forth in that new landmark.505
In sum, and no matter if the chosen vehicle for resolution
is RD Funding or another controversy, we respectfully submit Lucia
shall be the touchstone for the high Court’s eventual decision
regarding the Appointments Clause and the removal power. Moreover, Lucia’s safeguarding of liberty by imposing accountability
will, we steadfastly believe, dictate the very pattern and outcome
of the Supreme Court’s next addition to the Article II pantheon.
What we are most assured of is the following. Lucia, in its
brevity, in its forthrightness, in its certitude, made it absolutely
clear that inhabitants of administrative agencies who hold a
certain degree of power are officers of the United States.506
Thus, they must attain office in manner strictly compliant with
the Appointments Clause.507 Only in this way can the precept
“[l]iberty requires accountability” be met.508
Given that the new landmark known as Lucia has memorialized the foregoing as a constitutional truth, can the congruent
removal question be decided any differently? Respectfully, we
think not.
Id.
Ever so briefly, we note that the existence of a case pending before the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.,
No. 3:16-CV-356 (WHB) (JCG), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131595, at *2 (S.D.
Miss. Mar. 21, 2018), argued No. 18-60302 (5th Cir. Mar. 12, 2019), where the
agency’s constitutionality is challenged. As aforenoted, there is no lack of candidates for bringing Lucia’s unanswered question regarding the Appointments
Clause and the President’s power to remove administrative agency officials
before the Justices again, and this time in full flower.
506 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018).
507 Id. at 2055.
508 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito,
J., concurring).
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Rather, we are of the firm opinion that impediments to the
President’s power to remove a bureaucrat exercising significant
decision-making power are just as violative of the Appointments
Clause as deficiencies in the Chief Executive’s authority to appoint such office-holders in the first instance. And given the
parallels therein, our expectation is that Lucia will unequivocally
shape the next permutation of the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence.
E.Liberty, Accountability, and Lucia
From the outset of this Article, we have maintained that
Lucia is not a mundane instance of challenging administrative
agency power via questioning the authority of administrative
law judges. Rather, it encompasses a true test of the very bedrock principles of our ordered system of liberty, specifically the
preservation of that liberty by maintaining the accountability of
government to the People.
Let us commence this section of our commentary with the
fundamentals. From the founding to the present day, the American
people can boast of a government which functions by the consent
of the governed.509 This is so because the national government so
constructed derives all of its sovereign power from the People.510
The Appointments Clause of Article II contributes mightily
to preserving the consent of the governed. The proviso is elegant in
the simplicity of its operation, as follows: the President is accountable to the People, and officers of the United States are accountable to the Chief Executive.511 A citizen aggrieved by the actions
of a member of officialdom brings her complaint to the President,
who then requires the appointee to justify his actions.512
Not only does this assure the continued sovereignty of the
People, it also comports neatly with the President’s sworn duty
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”513 To fulfill
her own oath of office, the Chief Executive shall be compelled to
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S 624, 641 (1943).
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
511 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 513–14 (2010).
512 Id. at 497–98.
513 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (“The
President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot
oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”).
509
510
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commission competent and trustworthy individuals as the sworn
officers of the United States.514
Thereafter, and for as long as she holds office, the President
is free to call upon her appointees for an accounting.515 Conversely,
all true officers of the United States are keenly aware that they
are answerable to the Chief Executive, and, thereby, the People,
the ultimate holders of the sovereign power.516 In sum, this accountability guarantees liberty.
Lucia is further premised upon the fact that “[t]hose who
exercise the power of Government are set apart from ordinary
citizens.”517 Precisely to forestall this tiny fraction of the population
from standing apart and aloof from the general citizenry, the Supreme Court has declared it essential that “[t]here should never
be a question whether someone is an officer of the United States.”518
By its robust and fair application of the Appointments
Clause to the matter set before it, the Lucia Court assured that
those who hold office, and are entrusted with sovereign authority
by the President, are easily classified.519 Once properly categorized,
the Appointments Clause assures their accountability to the Chief
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 6 (the President commissions all officers
of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (all executive and judicial officers
must take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution).
515 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II), 881 F.3d 75, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Henderson, K., dissenting); id. at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Dep’t of
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring).
516 See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 142 (Henderson, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Transp.,
135 S. Ct. at 1238 (Alito, S., concurring).
As this Article went to press, several newly filed petitions for certiorari confirmed that the CFPB continues to be a flashpoint for Appointments Clause
challenges. Each petition, in relevant part, invokes the Article II maxims
postulated by Lucia. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, ___ U.S. ___, No. 19-7 (petition
pending) (alleging that, inter alia, the President’s inability to remove the agency’s
director at will is antithetical to the principles espoused by the Court in Lucia);
All Am. Check Cashing, Inc. v. CFPB, ___ U.S. ___, No. 19-432 (petition pending
for a writ of certiorari before judgment) (contending that, inter alia, the petitioner’s challenge to agency authority is precisely the kind of Appointments
Clause challenge contemplated by Lucia); see also Collins v. Mnuchin, ___ U.S.
___, No. 19-422 (petition pending) (similar Article II challenge to the constitutionality of the Federal Housing Finance Agency).
517 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1235 (Alito, J., concurring).
518 Id. (discussing Oath and Commission Clauses as vital prerequisites to
the exercise of sovereign power).
519 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–55 (2018).
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Executive who appointed them, and, thereby, to the People who
elected that same chief magistrate.
Lucia is a sterling example of these vaunted precepts in
action. The petitioner therein was aggrieved by the actions of
the SEC and its in-house adjudicator, each an ostensible part of
the Executive Branch.520 Under normal circumstances, as envisioned by the Appointments Clause, a citizen such as Mr. Lucia
would have brought his complaint to the President, who is accountable to the People, and the Chief Executive would have
called to account the agency and its jurist.
Yet that was a pointless exercise here, because the ALJ had
never been appointed by the President.521 Lacking appointment
by the Chief Executive meant a corresponding lack of accountability, an affront to the very raison d’etre of the Appointments
Clause. Thus, could the Supreme Court’s finding that the Clause
had been violated come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the
essence of the Article II proviso?
Moreover, if Lucia had been decided differently, it would
have fostered, not only a lack of accountability by the SEC’s
ALJs, but an evasion of accountability by the President. Notwithstanding that the President is accountable to the People,
how can she answer for the actions of those who have no cause
to account to her?522 Of the two unsavory possibilities set forth
above, we deem the latter to be far more dangerous to our ordered
system of liberty.
It must be said that the erosion of the accountability of
the President to the People is no less dangerous then the accretion of power to the Chief Executive. Nor does it matter if that
reapportionment comes swiftly or at glacial pace.523 Strange but
nevertheless true, diminishing the need for the President to
account increases the power of the Chief Executive. Either outcome is antithetical to the People’s liberty interest.
Id. at 2049–50.
Id. at 2050.
522 See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010) (“Without a
clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot determine on whom the
blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures
ought really to fall.”) (citation and quotations omitted).
523 See PHH Corp. v. CFPB (PHH II), 881 F.3d 75, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Henderson, J., dissenting).
520
521
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Another truism is that any dispersion of responsibility
within government only engenders more of the same.524 That is
why the accountability mandated by the Appointments Clause is
so vital to our ordered system of liberty. Implicit in Lucia is a
stern warning regarding the danger to freedom offered by nonchalance towards accountability, and the even greater danger of
severing the chain of accountability in its entirety.525
By means of its unswerving enforcement of the process for
appointment mandated by the Appointments Clause, Lucia keeps
faith with the long line of high Court precedent which has staunchly
defended the prerogative of the elected President to oversee the
unelected bureaucracy and prevent the latter from retreating
into a limbo of unaccountability.526
Lucia is invigorated from the Supreme Court’s prior declarations that we cannot permit the contemporary Administrative State to “slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from
that of the people.”527 This latest Supreme Court landmark fully
acknowledges that the consent of the governed degenerates into
mere theory unless those appointed to execute the laws are
compelled to account to the Chief Executive in a meaningful
way.528 Lucia marks the next evolution in that line of constitutional maxims, and it simultaneously draws strength from and
strengthens its antecedents interpreting and enforcing the mandates of the Appointments Clause.
For our coda, we repeat that Lucia did not merely adjudicate a dispute centered upon federal securities law. This new
landmark is so much more. It is truly a reaffirmation of the core
precept that liberty requires accountability, and that the Appointments Clause is one of the most important tools in assuring
the reality of that accountability to the People.
It is an unfortunate fact that since the 1930s, much of the
sovereign power has been delegated to a plethora of administrative
See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497.
Id. at 495–96 (decrying the situation where an executive organ is not
accountable to the President, and where the Chief Executive can deny responsibility for the actions of the bureaucrats ensconced within that agency).
526 Id. at 498–99.
527 Id. at 499.
528 See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 137 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
524
525
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agencies (including their administrative law judges), “making
accountability more elusive and more important than ever.”529
That is why Lucia represents such an important contribution
to the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence.
Since the founding of the nation, the Constitution, in all its aspects,
has been the solemn mechanism by which the People govern
themselves, through their duly elected leaders.530
And even as difficult as it might be in the vast ocean of
the Administrative State, the People remain firmly on the course
of self-government by keeping the bureaucracy accountable, via
bulwarks of liberty such as the Appointments Clause. Liberty
does require accountability, and Lucia shall henceforth play a
role in that vital exercise, by first clearly defining who stands as
officers of the United States and utilizing the strictures of the
Appointments Clause to assure their accountability, thereby
preserving liberty.
CONCLUSION
When all is said and done, we are confident that Lucia is
the beginning, not the end, of a fresh epoch of constitutional
challenges to executive power. Lucia is the next forthright postulation of the plain meaning of Article II, and the procedures it
mandates, all purposed to assure accountability to the People.
Moreover, while Lucia is forceful in its own right, it garners further strength from its classification of Freytag’s leading
principles, and, to a slightly lesser extent, reinforces landmarks
of an older vintage, such as Germaine. To be sure, even while
Lucia does not overtly reference Free Enterprise Fund, implicitly
the former incorporates the latter’s fundamental holdings as to
Article II’s basic protection of our ordered system of liberty.
In the preceding pages, we have candidly predicted that
Lucia shall be the progenitor of a new generation of Appointments Clause challenges to agency power. Utilizing the new
landmark as a template and guided by its axioms as to the process
for the constitutional appointment of officers of the United States,
parties subject to in-house adjudications can assure that the
529
530
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Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 499.
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presiding jurist holds her office in conformity with the constitutional mandates decreed by Article II.
Far more important, citizens can be confident there exists
an accountability of government which, in turn, safeguards their
liberty.
Are more Appointments Clause cases for the good? Unequivocally yes. The proviso, along with the rest of Article II, cabins
executive power, simultaneous with establishing the prerogatives of
the Executive Branch. It assures a process by which the nondescript functionaries of the Fourth Branch of government must
answer to the People, through the person of the Chief Executive.
We conclude this Article with the concise, yet eloquent,
words of Justice Alito. “Liberty requires accountability.”531 Lucia
now stands at the apex of the Appointments Clause jurisprudence
which guarantees that vital precept shall continue to safeguard
our precious liberties.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito,
J., concurring).
531

